The Adoption of Federal Scrutiny by State Supreme Courts in Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence by Farrell, Shane
Lawrence University
Lux
Lawrence University Honors Projects
12-2018
The Adoption of Federal Scrutiny by State Supreme
Courts in Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence
Shane Farrell
Lawrence University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lux.lawrence.edu/luhp
© Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by Lux. It has been accepted for inclusion in Lawrence University Honors Projects by an
authorized administrator of Lux. For more information, please contact colette.brautigam@lawrence.edu.
Recommended Citation
Farrell, Shane, "The Adoption of Federal Scrutiny by State Supreme Courts in Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence" (2018). Lawrence
University Honors Projects. 129.
https://lux.lawrence.edu/luhp/129
  
 
 
 
The Adoption of Federal Scrutiny by State 
Supreme Courts in Same-Sex Marriage 
Jurisprudence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: Shane Farrell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................2 
CHAPTER 2: VERMONT .............................................................................................................. 19 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 19 
PRECEDING CASE PRIOR TO BAKER HOLDING .................................................................................................... 20 
BAKER V. VERMONT DECISION ...................................................................................................................... 28 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................. 34 
CHAPTER 3: WASHINGTON ....................................................................................................... 37 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 37 
SINGER V. HARA .......................................................................................................................................... 38 
The ERA Prior to Singer ....................................................................................................................... 39 
Singer Decision ................................................................................................................................... 40 
Singer Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 42 
ANDERSEN V. KING COUNTY ......................................................................................................................... 42 
Privileges and Immunities Precedents ................................................................................................ 44 
Due Process Precedent ....................................................................................................................... 47 
Andersen Decision .............................................................................................................................. 48 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................. 53 
CHAPTER 4: CONNECTICUT ..................................................................................................... 55 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 55 
KERRIGAN V. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HEALTH DECISION ............................................................................... 57 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................. 62 
CHAPTER 5: CALIFORNIA ......................................................................................................... 62 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 62 
CASE LAW PRECEDING IN RE MARRIAGE CASES ................................................................................................. 63 
IN RE MARRIAGE CASES DECISION .................................................................................................................. 67 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................. 75 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 75 
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................................... I 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................................... I 
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES .................................................................................................................................. I 
Basis for the Obergefell Holding .......................................................................................................... IV 
Obergefell Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ VIII 
HISTORY OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE COURT RULINGS .......................................................................................... IX 
METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................................................... XVI 
 
 
 
 2 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 It would be logical to assume state supreme courts, when reviewing state constitutional 
challenges, interpret their state constitutions in unique and independent ways. This is not true in 
same-sex marriage cases. Counterintuitively, state supreme courts use a non-independent 
standard of review created by the federal government. My research shows that state courts are 
shaped by federal scrutiny standards in same-sex marriage cases. I will show how Washington, 
Connecticut, and California all adopted federal scrutiny. I will also show how Vermont did not 
adopt the federal scrutiny, yet was still shaped by the standard.  
 This idea – that state courts mimic federal court frameworks – is not novel; however, 
little literature has been devoted to state courts adopting the three levels of scrutiny in same-sex 
marriage jurisprudence. As Scott Dodson states in The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, state 
judicial systems have mimicked the federal judiciary across a spectrum of instances. This 
mimicry can be seen when state rules are similar to federal rules, also in some instances when 
rules are dissimilar, and under both procedural and substantive laws (University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, 165 L. Rev. 703). 
 State courts often follow federal courts when the applicable state rule mirrors the federal 
rule.  Although rules may be textually similar, a federal court’s interpretation of the federal rule 
is not preemptive of the state rule or binding on a state courts interpretation of the analogous 
state rule. Yet the typical state court tends to treat a federal appellate opinion as presumptively 
controlling, or at least as highly persuasive authority, without regard for any state policy reason 
for adherence or divergence. As Oakley and Coon found, “a substantial number of state courts 
reiterate that they give, ipso facto, great weight to federal court interpretations of analogous 
federal rules.” The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil 
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Procedure, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1367, 1378 (1986). For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
stated: “[W]here the Federal rule and our state rule are substantially similar, we will look to the 
Federal courts for guidance or interpretation of our own rule.” Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 
476 (R.I. 2004). 
 Pleading standards present a useful illustration. A pleading is a formal written statement 
of a party's claims or defenses to another party's claims in a civil action. The parties' pleadings in 
a case define the issues to be adjudicated in the action. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules, which states 
that a claimant need set out only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) was designed to liberalize pleading away 
from the old code-pleading standard requiring that the allegation of facts state a cause of action 
Scott Dodson, New Pleading in the Twenty-First Century: Slamming the federal Courthouse 
Doors?,19-23 (2013). The Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson 355 U.S. 41 (1957) decided Rule 
8 was a strongly liberalizing force and directed lower courts to abide by it. Conley interpreted 
Rule 8 to require only “a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair 
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley at, 557. States 
also have pleading rules, but Conley interpreted only Federal Rule 8. The states with replica 
rules universally adopted the Conley construction for their own pleading rules (Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (2007). (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 In 2007, the Supreme Court abruptly changed course. In a pair of decisions, Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court embraced a different 
normative model for pleading (one of restriction rather than access), imposing two new pleading 
requirements (plausibility and nonconclusoriness), and abrogated Conley’s famous “no set of 
facts” standard. Federal courts quickly got the memo after Iqbal and began applying the new 
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pleading standard relentlessly, as required. But the Supreme Court’s new interpretation does not 
control state courts, which are free to interpret their rules independent of federal interpretation.  
 Several state supreme courts have followed Twombly or Iqbal for no apparent reason. In 
Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court simply quoted the Supreme Court’s decisions and summarily adopted the new federal 
standard. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a case called Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisors 
LLC., 350 wis.2d 347 (2014), also adopted the Twombly “plausibility” standard, despite 
Wisconsin’s long previous adherence to the Conley “no set of facts” standard. See Doe v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 700 N.W.2d 180, 186-87 (Wis. 2005). As in Iannacchino, the 
Wisconsin court recited the Twombly opinion and adopted it without engaging in a state-specific 
policy analysis. see id. The Supreme Court of South Dakota adopted the Twombly pleading 
standard merely because the federal rule and the state rule both require a “showing” of 
entitlement to relief but offered no reasoning based on state policy.  see Sisney v. Best Inc., 754 
N.W.2d 804, 808-09 (S.D. 2008). 
 Mimicry of federal law can be so forceful that state courts follow federal courts even 
when the language of their state rules is different from the language of federal rules. Pleading 
standards again present a useful example, for Rule 8 and how its federal interpretation has 
exerted a strong pull even on states that retained code pleading. 
 A useful 2001 study by Thom Main illustrates this phenomenon. Main studied the way 
state courts in code-pleading states reacted to federal court interpretations of federal rules on 
pleading and summary judgment. Illinois state courts followed the Supreme Court’s interpretive 
gloss on pleading and summary judgment under the Federal Rules. In both federal and state 
courts a uniform “standard of notice” pleading dominated in 1966 before the Supreme Court’s 
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interpretation. However, after the ruling in Twombly and Iqbal, the pleading standard under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), “notice of fact” – instead of notice pleading -- arose in both 
court systems. Main also found a similar change in “notice” in the Pennsylvania court system. 
State appellate courts in New York—a code pleading state—are using the Supreme Court’s 
“plausibility” standard even though it applies only to pleadings in federal court (Edward D. 
Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 125–26 (2011)). 
 States mimic other procedural rules established by the federal court. More than forty 
states mimic the Federal Rules of Evidence (Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A Berger, 
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, Joseph McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. (2011)). States often follow the 
Supreme Court’s gloss on those rules, such as its controversial Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) decision regarding the admissibility of expert 
testimony. Before Daubert, almost all the states followed the seventy-year-old federal standard 
articulated in Frye v. United States, 315 F. 2d 491 (1963). Within six years, nineteen states had 
switched — although not required -- to the standard articulated in Daubert (The Impact of 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., on Expert Testimony: With Applications to 
Securities Litigation, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1999, at 3, 36). California’s propensity-evidence bar for 
sex-crime prosecutions is interpreted similarly to the Federal Rules of Evidence, despite textual 
dissimilarities (Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 65, 105-24 (2008)). 
Likewise, roughly half the states have modeled their own rules of criminal procedure on the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure § 1.2(f), at 50 
(2d ed. 1999)). 
 This mimicry extends beyond procedure and into the substantive area of law. Statutes: 
Federal Employment-Discrimination law—primarily Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age 
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—
has inspired copycat state statutory regimes, and developments in federal case law quickly echo 
in state jurisprudence (Alex B. Long If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent 
Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statues, 40 GA. L.REV. 469 
(2006)). After Title VII, most states swiftly and successfully enacted laws substantially mirroring 
Title VII’s provisions. After Title VII was enacted, all of the states that previously lacked 
antidiscrimination laws adopted them (Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence 
Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 57, 91 (2002)).  
 The extent of the similarities is striking. “[F]ederal and state antidiscrimination laws 
typically ran parallel to one another. Indeed, in many instances, a state’s antidiscrimination 
statute was based upon or used language almost identical to federal law” (Long, at 473) Aside 
from isolated pockets of novelty, states have approached antidiscrimination lawmaking 
principally by plagiarizing the federal statutes (Dodson at, 721). State appellate courts would 
often interpret their own state antidiscrimination statutes in the same manner that federal courts 
had interpreted the parallel federal statute (Long at 482). For example, in 1973, the Supreme 
Court interpreted Title VII to require a unique burden-shifting framework for establishing a 
prima facie case of employment discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green 411 U.S. 
792 (1973). Despite the fact that the Court’s framework was pure judicial gloss on a federal 
statute, state courts promptly adopted the burden-shifting framework for their own state statutes. 
 Similarly, Dodson states “As with pleading rules, the lure of statutory following is 
powerful even when the text of the state statute differs meaningfully from the federal statute. 
California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) defines ‘disability’ in a significantly 
different way than the federal ADA: the ADA requires that a disability ‘substantially limit[]’ an 
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individual while the FEHA requires only a limitation. Federal courts concluded that the term 
‘substantially’ in the ADA imposed a meaningful restriction on the type of disability eligible 
under the ADA. Yet despite the absence of “substantially” in the FEHA, California courts 
repeatedly interpreted the FEHA the same as the ADA, even relying on federal ADA cases for 
support.104 Eventually, the California legislature had to pass a ‘we really meant it’ amendment 
to the statute to make the proper standard—no substantiality was needed— clear.” (Dodson, at 
792). 
 Federal constitutional law has long exerted a pervasive pull on state constitutional 
law. State constitutional law often involves sensitive and important policy matters, on which 
local preferences tend to be stronger, more unified, and more extreme than national preferences. 
Justin Long theorized “that state constitutions are the repositories of the authoring community’s 
fundamental values” see Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 41, 
52 (2006). Further, state constitutions have a different history and erect a different governmental 
structure than the federal Constitution. Finally, constitutional governance is the most prominent 
feature of popular sovereignty, a cherished American ideal. see Gordon Wood, The Creation of 
the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 340-80 (1969). Yet with these factors state constitutional 
autonomy has not materialized. Instead, all states have declarations of rights that track the federal 
Bill of Rights, sometimes with a startling degree of mimicry. see Joseph Blocher, Reverse 
Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 332-33 (2011)  
 In analyzing the nature and function of state constitutions by contrast to the federal 
Constitution, including the judicial interpretation issues that arise under state constitutions and 
the processes for their amendment and revision, Robert Williams found state court 
interpretations of state constitutions have tended to follow federal court interpretations of the 
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U.S. Constitution (Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions, 194-95 
(2009)). Despite their formal interpretive independence, state courts have generally followed the 
Supreme Court’s lead, adopting its tests, doctrines, and interpretive methodologies as their own 
(Blocher, at 332-33)  
 Some state courts even follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning as an express matter 
of course. For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court has stated that the guarantee of freedom of 
speech is the same under both the Nebraska Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, and it 
adopted the policy of following the reasoning and analytical framework of the Supreme Court to 
interpret the guarantee under its own state constitution. Pick v. Nelson, 528 N.W.2d 309, 317 
(Neb. 1995). 
 Washington presumptively follows nonbinding federal court decisions unless contrary 
considerations override that presumption, such as differing text, differing history, differing 
structure, preexisting state law, and matters of particular state or local concern (Linda White 
Atkins, Note, Federalism, Uniformity, and the State Constitution—State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d 
54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), 62 Wash. L. Rev. 569, 578-80 (1987)). 
 Lastly, in discussing states’ application of “the federal model of equality” Jeffrey M. 
Shaman noted states have interpreted their equal protection guarantees to incorporate the same 
tiers of scrutiny that the U.S. Supreme Court has developed for the federal Equal Protection 
Clause (Jeffrey M. Shaman, Equality and Liberty in the Golden Age of State Constitutional Law, 
15-44 (2008)). Yet, the story I present here is novel in the scholarly world; state-same sex 
jurisprudence has been shaped by the federal three tiered levels of scrutiny.  
 A search of scholarly journal articles and law reviews of this strange mimicry between 
the states and federal government in relation to same-sex marriage yielded little to no results. 
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There is some research that suggests states do mimic the federal government, as I highlighted 
above, however, no article mentions the explicit relationship in same-sex marriage cases. Below 
I will discuss the multitude of articles I found that somewhat suggests that states mimic the 
federal government by using the standard of scrutiny, or conversely and more specifically, that in 
same-sex marriage case, states adopted federal scrutiny.  
 The scholarly article Recent Experience with Intermediate Scrutiny Under the North 
Carolina Constitution: Blankenship v. Bartlett and King ex rel. Harvey- Barrow v. Beaufort 
County Board of Education, places North Carolina’s constitutional adjudication model in the 
context of nationwide trends and models of state constitutional adjudication. The article 
catalogues the potential benefits and drawbacks of intermediate scrutiny and concludes that 
intermediate scrutiny may represent a viable alternative in resolving state constitutional 
dilemmas. This article highlights that state courts use tiers of scrutiny, but does not reference 
states adopting this from the federal government.1 
 In The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, Stephen Sigel 
highlights the origin and use of strict scrutiny, but says nothing about how states’ courts adopted 
the standard of review.2  
                                                 
1 The generally accepted schema for constitutional decisions of state appellate courts consists of 
four interrelated models—primacy, interstitial, dual sovereignty, and lockstep—that characterize 
a state’s interpretation of its constitution relative to federal interpretations of identical or 
analogous provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
 
The primacy model recognizes the state 
constitution as a fundamental source of rights and accordingly begins analysis with provisions 
from the state constitution. The interstitial model views U.S. constitutional rights as minimal and 
seeks supplementation from the interstices when the federal right does not resolve the claim or 
where the state constitution has more expansive language.
 
Under the dual-sovereignty model, 
both constitutions are analyzed more or less simultaneously.
 
The lockstep model construes state 
constitutional provisions identically with analogous provisions in the U.S. Constitution. 
 
2 The whole regime of varying the tiers of scrutiny is itself but one of the techniques by which 
the modern Court gives differential protection to constitutional norms. Most frequently, the 
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 In Comment: The Conflict between State and Federal Constitutionality Guaranteed 
Rights: A Problem of the Independent Interpretation of State Constitutions, the article 
categorizes the situations which may arise when state courts interpret their own constitutions 
more expansively than the Supreme Court has interpreted analogous provisions in the federal 
Constitution. After reviewing several possible solutions formulated to determine the "Winner" in 
such conflicts, the author concluded that only a flexible, sliding scale -- tiers of scrutiny-- 
approach is adequate to resolve the array of federalism problems likely to be presented to the 
court. Yet this still does not highlight the adoption of scrutiny in same-sex marriage cases.  
 In Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical Judiciary, Tara Leigh Grove reviews how the 
standard of scrutiny is of relatively recent vintage.3 She offers an explanation-and partial 
justification-for the creation of the standards of scrutiny in the early-to-mid twentieth century. 
The Supreme Court established these standards in the wake of major changes to its structural 
relationship with the inferior federal and state courts. Yet, there is no mention of how the lower 
state courts adopted that standard.
 
 
 Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, is a first effort to systematically 
consider the costs and benefits of using state constitutional doctrine to address problems arising 
                                                 
Court gives heightened protection to favored constitutional values simply by adopting a stringent 
standard or rule to adjudicate cases burdening those value  
 
3 The Supreme Court did not begin to develop these standards until the early-to-mid 
twentieth century-and even then, the Court did not settle on the rigid rules that we know 
today for several more decades. Prior to that time, the Court generally subjected 
government regulations to a single "reasonableness" test, examining whether a given law 
was a reasonable means of fulfilling a legitimate government purpose. This lack of 
historical pedigree might alone raise questions about the validity of the current tiers of 
scrutiny. 
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under the federal Constitution. The author argues that State constitutions and the federal 
Constitution overlap to a considerable degree, and state courts have relied heavily—at times 
completely and explicitly—on federal constitutional doctrine when interpreting their own 
charters, even when the language, history, and intent of the latter are distinct. The opposite, 
however, is not even remotely true. With a few notable exceptions, the Supreme Court has 
largely ignored state doctrine when constructing federal constitutional rules, even in areas in 
which the states have a widely shared and well-articulated constitutional doctrine addressing an 
issue on which the Supreme Court itself has never ruled. This argument takes the completely 
opposite approach of this thesis, that the federal government should adopt state standards.  
 Formalism: From Racial Integration to Same-Sex Marriage, exclusively tries to 
distinguish between formal and substantive inquiries in equal protection analyses. The article 
explains how the distinction relates to the sex discrimination argument and courts' rejections of 
the argument that same-sex marriage is analogous to Loving v. Virginia. This article however 
already assumes that states are using the tiered scrutiny system.  
 Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, by 
Christopher R. Leslie, discusses the flux in the level of scrutiny between courts when ruling on 
gender specific laws. This article makes the general assumption that states courts will apply 
some level of federal scrutiny. The article goes on to discuss how intermediate scrutiny should be 
uniformly applied to all gender based cases. 
 Lastly, in The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, Dodson, makes explicit mention of 
states mimicking the federal government. He states “Yet state constitutional autonomy has not 
materialized. Instead, all states have declarations of rights that track the federal Bill of Rights, 
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sometimes with a startling degree of mimicry. Likewise, state court interpretations of state 
constitutions have tended to follow federal court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, even to 
the point of adopting the Supreme Court’s tests and interpretive methodologies. For example, 
nearly all states have interpreted their equal protection guarantees to incorporate the same tiers of 
scrutiny that the U.S. Supreme Court has developed for the federal Equal Protection Clause.” 
Dodson, at 722. However, this brief paragraph is the only mention that states do so, with no 
specific examples.  
 To make this project manageable, I focused exclusively on state supreme courts. 
Vermont, Washington, Connecticut, and California, each had a state supreme court same-sex 
marriage case. These states serve an additional point, as each reviewed its respective same-sex 
marriage case using a different level of scrutiny. Washington ruled via the rational basis test, 
Connecticut used intermediate scrutiny, California used strict scrutiny, and Vermont, used its 
own form of review, an enhanced rational basis test. As stated earlier, it is peculiar that these 
states adopt this federal standard of review when is wasn’t required. Each state was shaped 
because of the federal levels of scrutiny, and each one reacted in a different way, all using 
different forms of scrutiny to review its same-sex marriage case.      
            The case law analyzed herein regarding the right of same-sex couples to marry — based 
on state statute and case law arising thereunder, not federal legislation nor federal case law — 
involves the doctrines of substantive due process and equal protection under the law. Substance 
due process places various restrictions on how state action (governmental conduct and laws, 
whether federal, state, municipal, etc.) can limit individual freedoms. Similarly, state action that 
treats one group of people more or less favorably than others is subject to scrutiny under the 
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doctrine of equal protection.  Most states have equal protection clauses in their state 
constitutions, as well as due process clauses.   
            Pursuant to the doctrines of substantive due process or equal protection, determining the 
constitutionality of state action (typically in the form of a statute) first requires a preliminary 
determination of whether the law implicates a fundamental right or involves the suspect 
classification of certain persons. See United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 
(1938)4 
 Because most states employ a variation of the three standards of review used by federal 
courts to adjudicate whether a law impermissibly burdens an individual’s constitutional rights — 
whether under the aegis of federal or state law -- an understanding of the three standards of 
review is required.  As a threshold matter, the prerequisite to employing the proper standard of 
review, also called the level of scrutiny, is ascertaining whether the alleged right is a 
fundamental right and/or the litigant is a member of a suspect classification.   
            A fundamental right, from a federal perspective, is a right almost always specifically 
enumerated in the first eight amendments to the U.S. constitution or a right implied by the Ninth 
Amendment.5  Typically, the Ninth Amendment is implicated when governmental action 
                                                 
4 United States v. Carolene Products Company, was an April 25, 1938 decision by the United 
States Supreme Court. The case affirmed the presumption of constitutionality and deferential 
review for most legislation, but in "Footnote Four," the Court indicated that a higher level of 
scrutiny should apply to cases involving: (1) a specific constitutional prohibition such as the Bill 
of Rights, (2) legislation restricting the political process, and (3) legislation directed at discrete 
and insular minorities.  Modern substantive due process and equal protection analysis using strict 
scrutiny all some have some DNA from this famous footnote, considered by constitutional legal 
giants, such as Harvard Law School’s professor, Lawrence Tribe, as probably the most famous 
footnote in American law. 
5 First Amendment provides the freedom to choose any kind of religious belief and to keep that 
choice private. Third Amendment protects the privacy of the home. Fourth Amendment protects 
privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. Fifth Amendment 
provides for the right against self-incrimination, which justifies the protection of private 
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impinges upon the right to privacy.  First recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), the fundamental right of privacy has been used to invalidate laws outlawing 
contraception among unmarried persons, and sex among consenting adults of the same sex. The 
Ninth Amendment is a central underpinning of Roe v. Wade 410. U.S. 113 (1974), and its 
progeny, which hold that the government must have a “compelling” interest in any laws 
burdening an adult woman’s desire to terminate her pregnancy — and the law must, in addition, 
be “narrowly tailored” (or the “least drastic means”) of effectuating the putative compelling 
governmental interest. Fundamental rights include speech, assembly, religion (First 
Amendment), the right to bear arms (Second Amendment), freedom from unreasonable search 
and seizure (Fourth Amendment), right against self-incrimination and right to due process (Fifth 
Amendment), right to counsel and a fair trial (Sixth Amendment), right to sue for damages under 
common law and to a jury trial (Seventh Amendment), right against cruel and unusual 
punishment (Eighth Amendment) and right to privacy (contraception, pregnancy termination, sex 
among same-sex partners, and as the esteemed future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
wrote in The Right to Privacy, Harvard Law Review, 4 L.R. 193 (Dec. 15, 1890) -- “the right to 
                                                 
information. Ninth Amendment is interpreted to justify a broad reading the Bill of Rights to 
protect privacy in ways not provided for in the first eight amendments. The Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits states from making laws that infringe upon the protections provided for in 
the first nine amendments (this is call the incorporation doctrine and makes the first nine 
amendments applicable to non-governmental federal action; whereas before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the first nine amendments of the Bill of Rights were considered 
protective against federal governmental conduct only). Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
state could make laws that violated freedom of speech, religion, etc. 
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be left alone ….”6  A single fundamental right acknowledged by the federal judiciary that is not 
in the Bill of Rights is the right to interstate travel.7  
 Central to determining the applicable standard of review is the threshold determination of 
whether the governmental action implicates a fundamental right or whether the group impacted 
by the legislation or governmental conduct is a “suspect” classification. Suspect classifications 
typically have three characteristics: immutability of the class (e.g., race or gender), lack of 
political power exercisable by the class for a variety of reasons (race, socio-economic factors, 
etc.), and a history of systemic discrimination against the class. Once a right has been construed 
as a “fundamental” right or a classification has been interpreted to be a “suspect” classification, 
federal courts and their state-court counterparts employ heightened scrutiny called “strict 
scrutiny” to determine whether the governmental action (typically legislation) improperly 
impinges upon that fundamental right or suspect classification. In order for the government’s 
action to be constitutionally permissible under strict scrutiny analysis, the governmental conduct 
must first be based on a “compelling” state interest. Almost always, there must be a consensus 
among experts in the subject matter of legislation/conduct that the same is, in fact, compelling. 
For example, in Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there was not a consensus among 
members of the scientific and medical communities as to when a fetus becomes viable. 
Accordingly, the Court held that Texas did not have a compelling interest in protecting a fetus 
during the first trimester because there was not a consensus within the scientific/medical 
                                                 
6 Seventy-five years later, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Douglas would use identical language — 
the right to be left alone — in the landmark decision of Griswold, which recognized the Ninth 
Amendment’s implied right to privacy.).   
7 The U.S. Supreme Court in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868) declared that freedom of 
movement is a fundamental right and therefore a state cannot inhibit people from leaving the 
state by taxing them.   
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communities as to when viability made a fetus a life form that Texas had a compelling interest in 
protecting. In other words, if there were not a consensus about when viability occurred — and 
hence when life began -- there could not be compelling interest in protecting it. 
 Under strict scrutiny analysis, once the government can demonstrate it has a compelling 
interest for its conduct or legislation, it must further establish that its conduct is narrowly tailored 
to effectuate that compelling interest. Legal scholars and courts often define “narrowly tailored” 
to mean that the governmental action impinging upon a fundamental right or suspect class is the 
“least drastic” means to effectuate the government’s compelling interest. Typically, when a court 
finds a statute (even one premised on a compelling interest) to not be narrowly tailored to the 
government’s objective, it is because the statute or governmental conduct is overly broad. The 
government, for example, has a compelling interest in public safety and crime prevention. 
Accordingly, the government may prohibit a “convicted felon” or “mentally incompetent” person 
from possessing/owning a firearm, despite the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms, because 
that statutory prohibition is based on a compelling interest and said law is narrowly tailored to 
effectuate the government’s goal of public safety. However, if the government passed a law 
saying anyone who has been convicted of any crime cannot own a firearm or anyone charged but 
acquitted of a felony cannot own a firearm, the reviewing courts would almost certainly find 
such laws to be overly broad and not narrowly tailored to fostering public safety. The citizen 
acquitted of a felony or the citizen convicted of littering typically does not pose a threat to public 
safety; therefore, prohibiting such individuals from possessing/owning a firearm, although based 
on a compelling interest in public safety, would not be the least drastic means to attain the 
government’s objective. Accordingly, such law would be violative of the Second Amendment. 
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The vast majority of cases declaring governmental action to be unconstitutional are the result of 
strict scrutiny analysis or a heightened standard of review. 
 If a statute impairs rights based on gender or the statute affects the rights of minors, an 
intermediate standard of review called “intermediate scrutiny” is employed by federal courts and 
the vast majority of state courts.8 Under the intermediate scrutiny standard of review, the 
government must show two things in order for the statute to pass constitutional muster. First, the 
government must demonstrate that the law or conduct in question is based upon an “important” 
governmental interest, and secondly, the law be “substantially” related to achieving that goal.9 
When a law limits one’s freedom based on gender, for example, the government must establish 
that its suspect classification is important and the law is substantially related to achieving that 
interest. For example, a blanket prohibition on hiring women firefighters because men are 
generally stronger, would not pass constitutional muster because, although fire rescue/safety is 
an important governmental interest, the blanket prohibition is not substantially related to hiring 
qualified firefighters because many women are physically able to perform the essential functions 
of a firefighter and some men are not physically able to perform those same functions.  
 Another common issue involving intermediate scrutiny involves a minor’s right to an 
abortion. Some states require parental consent or waiting a minimum amount of time after 
consultation with a physician, before being allowed to terminate the pregnancy. These 
restrictions are often viewed as substantially related to an important interest and thus held 
                                                 
8 Intermediate scrutiny is sometimes employed in age classifications, such mandatory retirement 
ages issued by the Federal Aviation Agency for commercial pilots. 
9 See e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court first applied 
intermediate scrutiny to gender-based classifications.”   
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constitutional.10 Conversely, when an adult is required to first consult with a doctor and then wait 
a minimum amount of time before having an abortion, these restrictions are typically declared 
unconstitutional. Moreover, older laws that required the consent of the woman’s husband have 
been universally declared invalid by U.S. federal courts.11 Other than a minor’s fundamental 
rights or classifications involving gender, intermediate scrutiny is infrequently used. It is worth 
noting that subjecting a law to intermediate scrutiny will often allow it to pass constitutional 
muster whereas the same law might be invalidated if strict scrutiny were applied. Restrictions 
that are constitutionally permissible with respect to a minor’s right to abortion (third-party 
consent, waiting periods, etc.) would almost certainly not be permissible under the standard of 
strict scrutiny applicable to an adult seeking an abortion. The Casey Court placed parental 
involvement firmly within a broader set of legal principles governing a woman's constitutional 
right to an abortion. Parental involvement and similar regulations were constitutional so long that 
they did not place an "undue burden" on a woman's ability to acquire an abortion. In other words, 
the level of scrutiny utilized is very often outcome-determinative as to whether the governmental 
action is constitutionally permissible. 
 When a law or governmental conduct does not implicate a fundamental right or impinge 
upon a suspect classification, the applicable standard of review is called low-level and uses the 
“rational relationship” test. Using this rubric, the government merely has to show two things:  the 
                                                 
10 Thirty-seven states require parental involvement in a minor's decision to have an abortion. 
Twenty-one states require parental consent; only three of which require both parents to consent. 
Eleven states require parental notification; only two of which require that both parents be 
notified. Five states require both parental consent and notification. Eight states require the 
parental consent documentation to be notarized. “Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortions.” 
Guttmacher Institute, 8 Aug. 2018 
11 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1996):  spousal notification laws place an "undue 
burden" on a woman's ability to get an abortion, whereas parental involvement laws do not. 
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governmental action (statute) serves a legitimate interest and the action (statute) is rationally 
related to attaining the same. As a general proposition, a statute evaluated under this low-level 
standard of review is nearly always upheld. If a city prohibited owning certain animals or dog 
breeds based on public safety, (because there is no fundamental constitutional right to own such 
animals) the statute would almost certainly be upheld under low-level scrutiny.  
 Turning now to the issue and right of same-sex marriage, this article will explore case 
law arising at the state level and how these courts have been shaped by federal scrutiny 
standards. 
Chapter 2: Vermont 
Introduction 
 
 Vermont was a leader among U.S. jurisdictions in protecting the rights of gays and 
lesbians in the 1990s. In 1990, it was one of the first states to enact hate crimes legislation that 
included sexual orientation. In 1992, it added sexual orientation to its anti-discrimination statute. 
In 1993, the Vermont Supreme Court, in a unanimous ruling, established second-parent adoption 
rights allowing someone in a same-sex relationship to adopt his or her partner's biological 
children. When the Vermont Legislature reformed the state's adoption statute in 1995, it made 
same-sex couples eligible to adopt.  
 In 1999 the state supreme court case Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864, 811 
A.L.R. 5th 67 (1999) legalized same-sex unions. In this case, the ban on same-sex marriage was 
challenged under the Vermont Common Benefits Clause (CBC). The CBC is somewhat 
analogous to the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, although the Vermont 
Constitution and the CBC were written before the U.S Constitution. Unlike the federal Equal 
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Protection Clause, the CBC is reviewed under a different process then the federal three-tiered 
system. The Baker court invalidated the ban on same-sex marriage based on an enhanced rational 
basis test. This enhanced rational basis review evolved from the cases, In re Property of One 
Church Street City of Burlington, 152 Vt. 260, 565 A.2d 1349 (1989), Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 
202, 628 A.2d 543 (1993), MacCallum v. Seymour, 165 Vt. 452, 686 A.2d 935 (1996), 
L’Esperance v. Town of Charlotte, 167 Vt. 162, 704 A.2d 760 (1997), and Brigham v. State, 166 
Vt. 246, 692 A.2d 384, 117 Ed. Law Rep. 667 (1997).  
 To understand how the ourt was impacted both by its preceding cases and the federal 
three-tiered system, it will be necessary to explore both the Baker decisions and the cases 
preceding Baker. (An endeavor that will be conducted in every chapter.)   
 
Preceding case prior to Baker Holding 
  
  This enhanced rational basis test can be traced back to State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, 
Inc., 141 Vt. 261, 448 A.2D 791 (1982). In Ludlow, a case which invalidated a Sunday closing 
law that discriminated among classes of commercial establishments on the basis of size — the 
Court accentuated that “unlike federal counterparts, this court is not constrained by consideration 
of federalism and the impact of its decision on fifty carrying jurisdictions.” Ludlow, at 268. The 
Ludlow Court declared that Article 7 of the Vermont constitution “only allows the statutory 
classifications ... if a case of necessity can be established overriding the prohibition of Article 7 
by reference to the “common benefit, protection, and security of the people.” Ludlow, at 268. 
This unique phrasing is different from the traditional requirement under Article 7 that legislative 
classification must reasonably relate to a legitimate public purpose. What this case did establish 
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was a more stringent standard of reasonableness than was associated with the rational basis 
review under federal analysis. Specifically, the Ludlow Court enhanced the requirement of a 
legitimate governmental interest (typically used in low-level scrutiny) with the requirement that 
Vermont currently balance “the nature and importance of the benefits and protections affected by 
the legislation; indeed, this is implicit in the weighing process. It did establish that Article 7 
would require a "more stringent" reasonableness inquiry than was generally associated with 
rational basis review under the federal constitution.” Baker, at 6.    
 This enhanced rational basis, founded by Ludlow, was continued in In re Property of One 
Church Street City of Burlington. In In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, a 
Vermont taxpayer sought review of a city taxation scheme imposing higher rates of taxation on 
nonresidential property. The Supreme held that the tax scheme did not violate the CBC of 
Vermont’s Constitution.12 
            In this case, transpiring 10 years before Baker, the Vermont Supreme Court’s definition 
of the CBC was more philosophical than was articulated in Baker. The Court defined the 
common benefit clause as follows:  
“The emphasis in the Common Benefits Clause is the obverse – what is 
required to protect the polity from the granting of privilege to the few. The 
                                                 
12 The taxpayer was a business partnership owning a six-story brick building. The building, 
previously a Masonic Temple, was renovated for commercial use in 1985. In 1986 the 
Legislature amended the Burlington City Charter as follows: 
“all personal and real property set out in the grad list which is not used as 
residential property, farmland, and vacant land zoned ‘recreation, 
conservation and open space (RCO)’ shall be classified as nonresidential 
property and shall be assessed at 120% of fair market value.” 
The taxpayer did not contest the fairness of the initial appraisal of the property, but contended 
that the assessment at 120% of fair market value was invalid under the Common Benefit Clause 
of the Vermont Constitution. 
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Common Benefit Clause is to protect the state from favoritism to individuals 
and to remind citizens of the sense of compact that lies at the heart of  
constitutional government.”  
  
 In In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, the Court established its 
standard of review. In doing so, it explained: “A preferential standard will be invalidated unless a 
compelling public need is demonstrated… The purpose of the preferential legislation must be to 
further a goal independent of the preference awarded, sufficient to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.” In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, at 515. This is a salient 
point. The Court was underscoring that legal challenges under the Common Benefits Clause will 
be reviewed via a preferential standard or what the federal courts call rational basis or low-level 
scrutiny. However, although it said “preferential,” the Court went on to say a “compelling public 
need” is required, which is strikingly similar to the language used by federal courts in high-level 
or strict scrutiny analysis, which demands “a compelling state interest.”  By linking a preferential 
standard with a compelling public need, the Court leaves open the possibility to review cases 
with a more stringent standard of scrutiny than used with the rational basis test. In practice, 
Vermont courts appear to be looking through a rational basis lens but in reality, reviewing with 
stricter, more demanding scrutiny. This gray area between the tiers of analysis will be adopted in 
later CBC cases.13 
                                                 
13 In In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, the Court went on to hold: “The 
amended Burlington Charter creates classifications of taxpayers; its goal is to raise total city 
revenues and benefit the city’s inhabitants as a whole. The underlying purposes for the 
classification challenged in this case are clear on the face of the Act and were presented to the 
Legislature during its consideration. ‘It is not a revenue neutral provision. It is a revenue raising 
issue. It was developed upon recommendation of a business person’s task force within the city 
and was developed with the notion to [sic] softening the blow of the loss of federal revenue 
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 A second case that adhered to a rational basis standard was the Lorrain Court. In Lorrain 
v. Ryan, an injured employee sued third-party tortfeasors (a person who commits a tort or civil 
wrong justifying monetary compensation) for damages arising out of a work-related accident, 
causing back and neck injuries. Employee’s wife, Patricia Lorrain, then sued for loss of 
consortium (the right of association or companionship). The Supreme Court held that the 
workers’ compensation statute’s exclusivity provision, to the extent it denied the wife’s right to 
recover for loss of consortium, violated the Common Benefit Clause of Vermont’s State 
Constitution.  In essence, the Plaintiff argued it was irrational to allow an injured worker to 
recover from a third-party tortfeasor while concurrently denying the spouse loss-of-consortium 
damages from that same party.14  
 The Lorrain Court set forth Chapter 1 Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution, stating, “… 
The Common Benefits Clause of Article 7, and applies when no fundamental right or suspect 
class is involved. Under Article 7, the test is ‘whether the law is reasonably related to the 
promotion of a valid public purpose.’ The test is the same under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”  Lorrain, at 212. Four years after 
In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, the Lorrain Court had a different 
interpretation of the CBC. The Lorrain Court believed that the CBC was identical to the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a sentiment which was not seen in early cases, 
                                                 
sharing that the city could expect.’” The Court further explained, “It surely will benefit some 
taxpayers more than others, but so long as the public purpose is paramount and the enactment 
reasonably related to that purpose, the statute is not made invalidated.” Lorrain, at 213. 
 
14 It should be understood that the exclusivity provision of workers’ compensation statutes in 
every state pertain to injuries to employees arising out of and in the course of their employment, 
and Patricia Lorrain was never an employee. 
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such as Ludlow.  In sum, the Vermont Supreme Court took careful note of federal equal 
protection jurisprudence and opted to fashion its own unique framework for analyzing the CBC. 
         The Lorrain Court, while adhering to the rational basis standard of review, said the 
exclusivity provision of Vermont’s workers’ compensation law was inapplicable, stating, 
“Plaintiff challenges her distinction because the injured employee does not receive workers’ 
compensation. The obvious rationale is that it is reasonable to extend the tort immunity of the 
employer to dependents who normally will benefit from the workers’ compensation. However, 
no public purpose is fostered by immunizing them from any part of their normal liability. 
Further, there is no rational basis for allowing the injured party’s tort claim while denying his 
spouse’s loss-of-consortium claim.” Lorrain, at 213. 
 This rational basis review mantra was propounded by the MacCallum Court. In 
MacCallum v. Seymour,15 Plaintiff MacCallum challenged the denial of her right to inherit from 
her uncle under both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution. The Court adjudicated 
the case under Article 7, stating, “Unless a fundamental right or suspect class is involved, the 
inquiry under Article 7 is whether the statute is reasonably related to the promotion of a valid 
public purpose. The, ‘statute is unconstitutional, as applied, if it treats similarly situated persons 
differently and the different treatment does not rest upon some reasonable consideration of 
legislative policy.’ Here the two sisters are treated differently; the question is whether the 
difference rests on a reasonable consideration of legislative policy.” MacCallum, at 457. Similar 
                                                 
15 In MacCallum v. Seymour, a person adopted as a child brought suit to enforce her right to 
inherit from the brother of her adopted father. The Vermont Supreme Court held that statute 
denying an adopted person’s right to inherit from collateral kin violated the CBC provision of 
Vermont Constitution.           
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to Lorrain, the standard of review is the rational basis test with the caveat, “reasonably related to 
the promotion of a valid public purpose.”   
 This relevant language used -- “historically been a target of discrimination” and 
“invidious and discriminatory” — is rhetoric developed under the U.S. Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause and employed in cases involving strict scrutiny.  Yet the MacCallum Court 
reviewed this case under rational basis review, once again an interesting amalgam of these multi-
tiered analyses. 
 The Court concluded, “After examining the two rationales proffered to validate the 
statute, they conclude that it is not reasonably related to a valid public purpose, at least with 
respect to persons who are adopted during the minority. We recognize that the situation may be 
‘entirely different in the case of one adopted after attaining the age of majority,’ and expressly do 
not rule on the constitutionality of the statute in that context.” MacCallum at, 392. This case, 
although based on a rational basis standard of review, used a more stringent level of scrutiny and 
applied the dicta and rhetoric of invidious discrimination.  
 MacCallum and L’Esperance v. Town of Charlotte, had similar rational basis reviews. In 
L’Esperance, Plaintiffs sued to compel a town to renew a lease for lakefront property under the 
same terms as the original lease. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the town received 
adequate and reasonable benefits from plaintiffs in connection with the lease, and the lease, 
therefore, could not be invalidated by the Common Benefits Clause, as argued by the 
government.   
  The L’Esperance  Court strays from the similarities perceived between the CBC and 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as articulated in Lorrain. Although in 
L’Esperance the Court concluded that although not the same, the CBC provides the same 
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benefits as the Equal Protection Clause. The standard of review is identical to that of MacCallum 
and past CBC cases – “enhanced” rational basis review. Although the L’Esperance Court 
specifies the standard of review, there is no mention of the preferential standard, nor of more 
stringent scrutiny from the past cases of MacCallum or Ludlow. The Court then holds, “We 
cannot allow a town to enforce a lease when it is economically productive and repudiate it when 
the assumed risks made less productive. We are reluctant to hold the common practice of long-
term, fixed-rent leases violate Article 7 if the financial terms become less advantageous to the 
town over time. With these principles in mind, we conclude that the town receives adequate and 
reasonable benefits from plaintiffs in connection with the lease. We hold that the lease terms in 
this case served a public purpose and were reasonably related to the promotion of that purpose.” 
L’Esperance, at 715.   
 Lastly, even regarding fundamental rights the Court in Brigham v. State, used an 
enhanced rational basis review. In Brigham, students, property owners, and school districts filed 
claims against the state of Vermont seeking declaratory relief with respect to alleged disparities 
in the quality of public education resulting from a statewide system of public school funding. 16 
17 
                                                 
16 The Supreme Court granted motion and held: (1) the state’s system of financing public 
education did not satisfy the requirements of the Education Clause of State Constitution; (2) the 
state’s system of financing public education violated the Common Benefits Clause of the state 
constitution; and (3) the education and common benefits clauses require the state to ensure 
substantial, rather than absolute, equality of educational opportunity throughout state. The 
plaintiffs contended that disparities in the quality of public education resulting from a statewide 
system of public school funding violated the Common Benefits Clause.   
 
17In Brigham v. State, students, property owners, and school districts filed claims against the 
state of Vermont seeking declaratory relief with respect to alleged disparities in the quality of 
public education resulting from a statewide system of public school funding. Public schools in 
Vermont are financed principally by two means: funds raised by cities and towns solely through 
assessments on property within their jurisdiction, as authorized by 16 V.S.A. 511, and funds 
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            Unlike the cases previously analyzed earlier in this article, here we have a fundamental 
right at stake – namely, education. Although the other cases were decided on a rational basis 
standard of review, this case should certainly have had a more exacting scrutiny.  
             In a Per Curiam Opinion18 the justices wrote, “As a general rule, challenges under the 
Equal Protection Clause are reviewed by the rational basis test .… This is not a case, however, 
that turns on the particular constitutional test to be employed. We are simply unable to fathom a 
legitimate governmental purpose to justify the gross inequities in educational opportunities 
evident from the record.” Brigham, at 265. The Court seemed to jump ahead of itself.  It never 
explicitly said what type of scrutiny it was using. Instead, it jumped head-first into the decision, 
stating it is “unable to fathom a governmental purpose to justify the gross inequities.” Brigham, 
at 265. Thus, the school revenue law did not pass muster under even low-level or rational 
relationship test scrutiny.  Brigham was the last major case involving the CBC before the 
Vermont Supreme Court heard Baker. These five cases built the foundation and framework of 
the ruling in Baker. 
 In summary the precedent set by Ludlow was continued by  In re Property of One Church 
Street City of Burlington, where the Court linked a “preferential standard” that the law further 
advance a “compelling state interest,” and in so doing, fosters and the precedent of increased or 
enhanced rational basis scrutiny. Lorrain v. Ryan, where the Court invalidated a law based on the 
rational basis test, making clear it employed a more stringent standard of scrutiny than used by 
                                                 
distributed by the state under a complex aid formula, known as the Foundation Plan. The purpose 
of a foundation formula is to enable each school district to spend an amount per pupil that will 
provide at least a minimum-quality education, known as the foundation cost. Basically, state aid 
is calculated as the difference between the foundation cost for all students in a district and the 
amount the district can raise itself at the foundation tax rate. 
  
18 The entire court participated in the opinion. 
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federal courts in matters not involving a fundamental right/suspect classification. MacCallum v. 
Seymour, employed its version of enhanced rational basis review. It did so by using rhetoric such 
as “invidious discrimination” and “history of discrimination,” terms commonly used in federal 
strict-scrutiny-standard cases. L’Esperance v. Town of Charlotte,  was the only Vermont 
Supreme Court decision not to mention a heightened level of scrutiny; however, that decision 
affected only property rights. Brigham v. State, the Court was able to use Vermont’s unique 
enhanced standard of review to get the same result — that is, invalidation of the state’s statute 
even with a fundamental right at stake -- education.  
 It is evident from past cases, that Vermont has adopted to use its own type of review. 
However, the Baker Court still oddly mentions the federal standard, even though it didn’t have 
to. The Baker Court explicitly said, “this approach, rather than the rigid, multi-tiered analysis 
evolved by the federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment, shall direct our inquiry under 
Article 7.” Baker, at 12. The Baker and the courts before all make explicit reference to the 
federal equal protection clause although they weren’t required. Courts also borrowed federal 
language in requiring a “compelling public need.”With this is mind we will review the Baker 
decision analyzing it with the backdrop of these precedential cases.  
Baker v. Vermont Decision 
 The right to same-sex marriage — that is, the right for legal-age adults of the same sex to 
be married under Vermont state law — was first recognized by the Vermont Supreme Court in 
Baker v. Vermont. The premise for the Court’s holding was the Common Benefits Clause, V.T. 
Const. Chap. I, art. 7.  found in Vermont’s constitution, which reads in relevant part:  
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the 
particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of 
 29 
persons, who are a part only of that community; and that the community 
hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform or alter 
government, in such manner as shall be, by that community, judged most 
conducive to the public weal. 
 
Two statutes governed marriage in Vermont during the time before Baker. First, Chapter 1 of 
Title 15, entitled “Marriage," defined the requirements and eligibility for entering into a marriage 
as “the union of one man and one woman as husband and wife.”19 Second, Chapter 105 of Title 
18 of the Vermont statutes, entitled "Marriage Records and Licenses,” defined marriage license 
eligibility. The statute mandates the following:  
… the issuance of marriage licenses, which provides, in part, that the 
license "shall be issued by the clerk of the town where either the bride or 
bridegroom resides." 18 V.S.A. § 5131(a). 
           
 The Baker Court relied on the definition of “bride” and “bridegroom” in Black’s Law 
Dictionary, concluding that the Vermont marriage statute prohibited nuptial parties of the same 
gender, given that a bride is defined as female and a bridegroom is defined as male. 
The Baker Court ultimately held that the Common Benefits Clause of the state constitution was 
violated because the relevant Vermont statute defined marriage as between opposite-sex partners 
and that definition (and hence prohibition) on same-sex marriage was not rationally related to the 
government’s purported legitimate interest in promoting “the link between procreation and child 
rearing.”  Baker, at 15.    
            The CBC has an “affirmative and unequivocal mandate of the first section, providing that 
government is established for the common benefit of the people and community ….” Baker, at 9. 
This assumption of equal benefits for everyone is reflected in the second section: “this prohibits 
                                                 
19 See also Webster's New International Dictionary 1506 (2d ed. 1955) (marriage consists of the 
state of "being united to a person ... of the opposite sex as husband or wife"). 
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not the denial of rights to the oppressed but rather the conferral of advantages or emoluments 
upon the privileged.” Baker, at 9. Chief Justice Amestoy, writing for the majority, stated: “{the 
words of the common benefits clause} do not set forth a fully formed standard of analysis for 
determining the constitutionality of a given statue, they do express broad principles … chiefly is 
the principle of inclusion.” Baker, at 9. At its core, the CBC expressed a vision of government 
that afforded every Vermonter its benefit and protection and provided no Vermonter particular 
advantage. This can be seen in W. Adams, The First American Constitutions 188 (1980), in 
which he claims the overarching goal of the framers using the CBC was, “not only that everyone 
enjoy equality before the law or have an equal voice in government but also that everyone have 
an equal share in the fruits of the common enterprise.”   
           The Baker Court concluded that the proper approach in reviewing this case would not 
involve “the rigid, multi-tiered analysis used by the federal courts under the Fourteenth 
Amendment ….” Baker, at 12, instead using its own particularized analysis of enhanced low-
level scrutiny as explained above.  
            The Court began with a two-tiered analysis, first defining the “part of the community” 
disadvantaged by law, and next, the statutory basis that distinguishes those protected from those 
excluded by law. The Court declared that it would deviate again from the federal analysis of 
“suspect classification,” stating: “The artificiality of suspect-class labeling should be avoided 
where, as here, the plaintiffs are afforded the common benefits and protections of Article 7, not 
because they are part of a "suspect class," but because they are part of the Vermont community” 
Baker, at 13.  
            The “part of the community” that is disadvantaged by 18 V.S.A. § 5131(a). is 
indisputable — the homosexual community. The second aspect of this two-tiered analysis is the 
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government’s purpose in drawing a classification that includes some members of the community 
within the scope of the challenged law while excluding others.  To ascertain if the challenged 
law bears a reasonable and just relation to the governmental purpose, the Court found that “(1) 
the significance of the benefits and protections of the challenged law; (2) whether the omission 
of members of the community from the benefits and protections of the challenged law promotes 
the government's stated goals; and (3) whether the classification is significantly underinclusive 
or overinclusive.” Baker, at 13. 
            The government’s purported principle purpose for excluding same-sex couples from the 
legal benefits of marriage is ostensibly “furthering the link between procreation and child 
rearing” Baker, at 13. The State contended, further, that the legislature could reasonably believe 
that sanctioning same-sex unions "would diminish society's perception of the link between 
procreation and child rearing ... [and] advance the notion that fathers or mothers ... are mere 
surplusage to the functions of procreation and child rearing." Baker, at 15. The State argued that 
since same-sex couples cannot conceive a child on their own, state-sanctioned same-sex unions 
"could be seen by the Legislature to separate further the connection between procreation and 
parental responsibilities for raising children.” Baker, at 15. 
            In response to the State’s claim, the Court stated, “It is equally undisputed that many 
opposite-sex couples marry for reasons unrelated to procreation, that some of these couples never 
intend to have children, and that others are incapable of having children” Baker, at 16. Also, 
“with or without the marriage sanction, the reality today is that increasing numbers of same-sex 
couples are employing increasingly efficient assisted-reproductive techniques to conceive and 
raise children.” Baker, at 17 the Court concluded that, “If anything, the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the legal protections incident to marriage exposes their children to the precise risks 
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that the State argues the marriage laws are designed to secure against ….” Baker, at 17. The 
question thus became whether the exclusion of a relatively small but significant number of 
otherwise qualified same-sex couples from the same legal benefits and protections afforded their 
opposite-sex counterparts contravened the mandates of Article 7.  
            As noted, in determining whether a statutory exclusion reasonably relates to the 
governmental purpose, it is appropriate to consider the history and significance of the benefits 
denied.  In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court's point was 
unequivocally clear: access to a civil marriage license and the multitude of legal benefits, 
protections, and obligations that flow from it significantly enhance the quality of life in our 
society. Accordingly, for the first time, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a state law 
(Virginia’s) banning interracial marriage.  The benefits and protections incident to a marriage 
license under Vermont law are robust. They include, “for example, the right to receive a portion 
of the estate of a spouse who dies intestate and protection against disinheritance through elective 
share provisions, under 14 V.S.A. § § 401-404, 551; preference in being appointed as the 
personal representative of a spouse who dies intestate, under 14 V.S.A. § 903l.”  Baker, at 17.  
            The most substantive of the State's remaining claims, said the Baker Court, related to the 
issue of child-rearing. It is conceivable that the Legislature could conclude that opposite-sex 
partners offer advantages in this area, although the Court noted that child-development experts 
disagreed and the answer was decidedly uncertain (note the lack of consensus referenced above 
in Roe as to when life begins). The argument, however, contains a more fundamental flaw, and 
that is the Legislature's endorsement of a policy diametrically is at odds with the government’s 
claim. “In 1996, the Vermont General Assembly enacted, and the Governor signed, a law 
removing all prior legal barriers to the adoption of children by same-sex couples. At the same 
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time, the Legislature provided additional legal protections in the form of court-ordered child 
support and parent-child contact in the event that same-sex parents dissolved their "domestic 
relationship."  In light of these express policy choices, the State's arguments that Vermont public 
policy favors opposite-sex over same-sex parents or disfavors the use of artificial reproductive 
technologies are patently without substance.” Baker, at 18. 
            Finally, it is suggested that the long history of official intolerance of intimate same-sex 
relationships cannot be reconciled with an interpretation of Article 7 that would give state-
sanctioned benefits and protection to individuals of the same sex who commit to a permanent 
domestic relationship. The Baker Court responded by quoting it decision in Brigham v. State, 
which held as follows: “[E]qual protection of the laws cannot be limited by eighteenth-century 
standards.” Baker, at 19. Thus, to the extent that state action historically has been motivated by 
an animus against a class, that history cannot provide a legitimate basis for continued unequal 
application of the law. Second, “whatever claim may be made in light of the undeniable fact that 
federal and state statutes--including those in Vermont--have historically disfavored same-sex 
relationships, more recent legislation plainly undermines the contention.” Baker, at 19. 
 Thus, viewed in the light of history, logic, and experience, the court concluded that none 
of the interests asserted by the State provided a reasonable and just basis for the continued 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits incident to a civil marriage license under 
Vermont law. 
 The Baker Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled under Chapter I, Article 7, of the 
Vermont Constitution to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to 
married opposite-sex couples. However, they stated, “We do not purport to infringe upon the 
prerogatives of the Legislature to craft an appropriate means of addressing this constitutional 
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mandate, other than to note that the record here refers to a number of potentially constitutional 
statutory schemes from other jurisdictions. These include what are typically referred to as 
"domestic partnership" or "registered partnership" acts, which generally establish an alternative 
legal status to marriage for same-sex couples, impose similar formal requirements and 
limitations, create a parallel licensing or registration scheme, and extend all or most of the same 
rights and obligations provided by the law to married partner.” Baker, at 19. It is noteworthy that 
in 2000, the Vermont legislature responded by legalizing civil unions for same-sex couples.  
Conclusion 
  Relying upon an eclectic amalgam of case law and precedent, the Baker Court 
invalidated the statutory ban on same-sex marriage while using the CBC to bludgeon Vermont’s 
opposite-sex marital requirement into the constitutional graveyard. In its analysis, the Court 
reviewed precedent, noting the case law history of “enhanced” rational basis review. This 
enhanced rational basis review had a more stringent standard of reasonableness than was 
associated with the rational basis review under federal analysis.  More specifically, the 
enhancement was the product of augmenting the requirement that the state’s interest be more 
than merely legitimate, which under federal law is sufficient to pass scrutiny under the rational 
relationship test or a low-level standard of review. At first blush, this move by the Baker Court to 
articulate a heightened standard of review seems novel.  This more stringent level of scrutiny, 
however, was born twenty years earlier in Ludlow.  Between Ludlow in 1982 and Baker in 1999, 
there is a visible evolution and process by which Vermont courts reviewed CBC cases. One 
fundamental thread throughout is the enhanced scrutiny set forth in Ludlow.  
 In Baker, the Court did not cite or rely upon In re Property of One Church Street City of 
Burlington. However, there are similarities in how the two decisions view the CBC. As Chief 
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Justice Allen, writing for the majority in In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, 
said, “to remind citizens of the sense of compact that lies at the heart of constitutional 
government” In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, at 89, is congruent with 
Chief Justice Amestoy’s textual analysis and the founders’ intent in Baker. Both Justices 
reference the “community” of Vermont. Similarly, in describing the CBC, both cases describe its 
purpose as limiting favoritism of any kind. Justice Allen, however, emphasized that the CBC was 
to prevent state action from hurting individuals. This is a marked difference from Baker. In 
Baker, the Court describes the CBC as protecting proscription against governmental favoritism 
toward not only groups or "set[s] of men," but also toward any particular "family" or "single 
man," Baker, at 9.   Although both Vermont Supreme Court opinions reference protection from 
state favoritism, the CBC, according to Baker, is designed to protect the people; whereas in, In re 
Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, the CBC is to about protecting the 
government from any wrongdoings of favoritism.  
 Baker and previous Vermont appellate case law strayed from using the “fundamental 
right” and “suspect classification” terminology, described earlier. Similar to the Lorrain Court.20 
  Baker has many striking similarities to the MacCallum decision. Even before the 
MacCallum Court addressed the definition of the Common Benefits Clause, it set the backdrop 
by reviewing the statutory scheme and the changing nature of adoption within Vermont and the 
United States as a whole. This in-depth look at the classification of adopted people, history, and 
language of the statute is analogous to reasoning employed in Baker. Similarly, both courts make 
                                                 
20 It appears that the Lorrain Court was not adhering to any strict precedential value or standard 
of review, but rather concerned with coming to the “right” result. 
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the point that they are not constrained by the language or ideas prevalent at the time the law or 
statute was written. 
 In MacCallum, the Plaintiff brought claims under both the federal Equal Protection 
Clause and the CBC.  It would seem that the rigid framework of federal equal protection analysis 
would be more easily navigable for the Justices; yet the Court choose to use Vermont’s CBC. 
This suggests that, although both have multi-tiered standards of analysis, both entities have 
different thresholds for laws to be invalidated. Additionally, common sense suggests that the 
Vermont Supreme Court had the objective of protecting someone similarly situated to Ms. 
MacCallum, and the CBC provided the optimal remedy to achieve that result.21 This inquiry by 
the MacCallum Court involving historical discrimination against adopted people shares striking 
similarities to the concerns expressed by the Baker Court, which carefully scrutinized the 
discrimination waged against same-sex couples and gay people, more generally. 
 This case, although based on a rational basis standard of review, used a more stringent 
level of scrutiny and applied the dicta and rhetoric of invidious discrimination. Baker, as stated 
above, cited this case as a blueprint for using rational basis review, while exacting a more 
stringent scrutiny. Vermont’s appellate courts are essentially saying that under the CBC the 
government must show something akin to a compelling state interest and a statute — that in 
practice — is rationally related to its attainment.  This requirement by Vermont’s Supreme Court 
makes it much more likely that a law will be declared unconstitutional. 
                                                 
21 It is worth noting from the Court’s ruling that, although Vermont employed an enhanced low-
level standard of review (because the right to inherit is not a fundamental right nor are putative 
beneficiaries of an inheritance thereby a suspect class) if this adjudication involved a 
fundamental right or suspect classification, it would trigger strict scrutiny under both federal and 
Vermont law. Conversely, without the protections afforded by the CBC, Ms. MacCallum’s 
claims would fail under alternate legal theories.   
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 Similar to MacCallum and Baker, the Brigham Court relied heavily on both the founders’ 
intent and legislative history, similar to Baker. The Brigham Court warned, “While history must 
inform our constitutional analysis, it cannot bind it.” We see this similar mantra in Baker, 
“Although historical research yields little direct evidence of the framers' intentions, an 
examination of the ideological origins of the Common Benefits Clause casts a useful light upon 
the inclusionary principle at its textual core.” (9).  Brigham was the last major case involving the 
CBC before the Vermont Supreme Court heard Baker.  
 Although Baker relied on these precedential cases, the court still felt obliged to explain 
itself as to why it didn’t use the federal standard of review22 The Baker Court, does not need to 
refer to the federal levels of scrutiny; it is interpreting its own constitution, with no obligation to 
federal jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Court and did not need to mention the federal Equal 
Protection Clause at all. A trend with we see in previous courts, referencing federal equal 
protection but ruling based off the CBC. Although the Baker did not adopt federal scrutiny, the 
Court was shaped in its opinion because it qualified itself on the type of review; the Court 
needed to explain its rationale.  
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Washington 
Introduction 
 Unlike Vermont’s singular same-sex marriage case, with its singular statutory challenge 
to the ban on same-sex marriage, Washington State has multiple statutory challenges spanning 
                                                 
22 “this approach, rather than the rigid, multi-tiered analysis evolved by the federal courts under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, shall direct our inquiry under Article 7” Baker, at 12.  
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multiple cases encompassing the prohibition of same-sex marriage. The first of these challenges 
came in Singer v. Hara, 11 Wn.App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974), when a same-sex couple was 
denied a marriage license from the State. The couple filed suit claiming this violated their rights 
under Washington State’s Equal Rights Amendment. The Court upheld the ban on same-sex 
marriage, and it took over thirty years for another challenge to arise before the Washington 
Supreme Court. In Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (2006), gay and lesbian couples who 
sought marriage licenses sued the county seeking to invalidate Washington State’s Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) as unconstitutional insofar as it prohibited same-sex marriage on the 
basis of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the state constitution, the Due Process Clause of 
the state constitution, the Privacy Clause of the state constitution, and the state’s Equal Rights 
Amendment. 
 For analysis purposes, Washington possess a unique organizational issue. With two 
different cases spanning multiple constitutional challenges, the first section of this chapter will 
highlight the influence of the federal level of scrutiny in Singer, then review the Court’s 
decision. The second half will discuss the preceding cases in relation to the specific 
constitutional challenges raised in Andersen, then discuss the Andersen Court’s decision. 
 
Singer v. Hara 
 Singer was one of the earliest same sex marriage cases to be adjudicated in the U.S. The 
Court upheld Washington statute RCW 26.04.010 limiting the right of marriage to opposite-sex 
adults. The same-sex couple argued the ban violated Washington State’s Equal Rights 
Amendment which reads in relevant part: “Equality of rights and responsibility under the law 
shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.” W.A. Const. art. XXXI, cl. 1. 
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The ERA Prior to Singer 
            Washington State’s ERA was passed and ratified in 1972. That same year, Mr. Singer 
filed suit in late April. This was the first ERA case in Washington. The Court had no state or 
federal precedent to rely upon. Due to the novelty of this ERA case, the Court had no framework 
for review, evident by the lack of organization in the opinion highlighted below. The Court 
reviewed each side’s arguments without a firm grasp of the standard of review, legislative intent, 
or prevailing political sentiment. The Court acknowledged this case of first impression, stating, 
“To our knowledge, no court in the nation has ruled upon the legality of same-sex marriage in 
light of an equal rights amendment.” Singer, at 250.  
 The primary purpose of Washington’s ERA was to overcome discriminatory treatment 
between men and women on account of sex. The popular slogan at the time was “Equal Pay for 
Equal Work,” expressing the notion that a qualified female be treated no less favorably than an 
equally qualified man.2324 The Singer Court explained, “Prior to the adoption of the [Washington 
State] ERA, the proposition that women were to be accorded a position in the law inferior to that 
of men had a long history. Thus, in this context, the purpose of the ERA is to provide the legal 
                                                 
23 The House approved the measure in 1970, and the Senate did likewise in 1972. The fight was 
then taken to the states. ERA-supporters had the early momentum. Public opinion polls showed 
strong favorable support. Thirty of the necessary thirty-eight states ratified the amendment by 
1973. But then the tide turned. From nowhere came a highly organized, determined opposition 
that suggested that ratification of the ERA would lead to the complete unraveling of traditional 
American society. “The Equal Rights Amendment.” U.S. History Online Textbook, 4, Sept, 
2018. 
 
24American society has always confined women to a different and, by most standards, inferior 
status. The discrimination has been deep and pervasive. Emerson, Thomas I.; Brown, Barbara 
A.; Falk, Gail; and Freedman, Ann E., "The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis 
for Equal Rights for Women" (1971). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2799. 
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protection, as between men and women, that apparently is missing from the state and federal 
Bills of Rights, and it is in light of that purpose that the language of the ERA must be construed.” 
Singer, at 258. 
 
Singer Decision 
           The Washington Supreme Court highlighted that an individual of Washington State is 
afforded no greater protection under the ERA unless “he or she first demonstrates that a right or 
responsibility has been denied solely because of that individual’s sex.” Singer, at 258. The ERA 
did not create any new rights or responsibilities, it merely “insures that existing rights and 
responsibilities or such rights and responsibilities as may be created in the future, which 
previously might have been wholly or partially denied to one sex or to the other will be equally 
available to members of either sex.” Singer, at 259. The Appellants’ first argument rested on the 
fact that RCW 26.04.010 authorized marriages by “persons of the age of eighteen years, who are 
otherwise capable.” Singer, at 249. The legislature had not defined the competency of marriage 
but only the competency of individuals seeking marriage. In other words, the statute did not 
define marriage as between opposite-sex parties but rather as between non-biologically related 
adults. However, the State argued that the term “persons” in the statute “merely reflects a 1970 
amendment which substituted the word ‘persons’ for the prior references to ‘males’ and 
‘remales’ [sic] to implement the legislature’s elimination of differing age requirements.” Singer, 
at 249. The Court agreed with the State’s analysis that the statute did not permit same-sex 
marriage despite the complete absence of any requirement within the statute that couples seeking 
marriage be of the opposite sex. 
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            The crux of the appellants’ argument was that the language of the amendment “leaves no 
question of interpretation … to make sex an impermissible legal classification.” Singer, at 250-
51. Thus, “to construe state law to permit a man to marry a woman but at the same time to deny 
him the right to marry another man is an unconstitutional classification ‘on account of sex’” 
Singer, at 251. In support of their argument, the Appellants cited Loving, Perez v. Lippold, 32 
Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), and J.S.K Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6 Wash.App. 43, 
492 P.2d 600 (1971). The Court disagreed with the appellants’ analogy to interracial marriage as 
first set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Loving. The Singer Court concluded, “In Loving and 
Perez we do not find such analogy. The operative distinction lies in the relationship which is 
described by the term marriage itself, and that relationship is the legal union of one man and one 
women.” Singer, at 253. It further stated, “There is no analogous sexual classification involved in 
the instant case because Appellants are not being denied entry into the marriage relationship 
because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one which may be entered into only 
by two persons who are members of the opposite sex.” Singer, at 254-55. Similarly, in J.S.K. 
Enterprises, Inc., the Singer Court concluded the right recognized “on the basis of principles 
applicable to employment discrimination has nothing to do with the question present by 
appellants.” Singer, at 256. 
            The Singer Court continued, “The purpose of the ERA makes it apparent why the 
amendment does not support appellants’ claim of discrimination. The primary purpose of the 
ERA is to overcome discriminatory legal treatment as between men and women ‘on account of 
sex’” Singer, at 257. The Court claimed there was no right or responsibility that had been denied. 
With no right denied, an individual was not afforded protection under the ERA. The ERA did not 
prohibit all sex-based classifications. The Court stated, “A generally recognized ‘corollary’ or 
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exception to even an ‘absolute’ interpretation of the ERA is the proposition that laws which 
differentiate between the sexes are permissible so long as they are based upon unique physical 
characteristics, rather than upon a person’s membership in a particular sex.” Singer, at 259. 
            The Court believed this was not invidious discrimination, because same-sex couples are 
not able to procreate from the union they form. Thus, “the refusal of the state to authorize same-
sex marriage results from such impossibility of reproduction rather than from an invidious 
discrimination ‘on account of sex.’” Singer, at 260.   
 
Singer Conclusion 
 The Court, did not delve into an equal protection analysis. It imprudently skipped any 
analysis of whether same-sex couples were a suspect classification and even failed to address 
whether marriage was a fundamental right, and whether there was a documented history of 
discrimination against homosexuals. The Court upheld the ban on rational basis review, ruling 
that the state had a rational basis for limiting marriage. Thus from this limited judicial review, it 
seems the court used classic federal review standards. 
  
Andersen v. King County          
  It took thirty years for another same-sex marriage case to percolate up to the Washington 
Supreme Court. In Andersen v. King County gay and lesbian couples who sought marriage 
licenses sued the county seeking to invalidate Washington State’s Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) as unconstitutional insofar as it prohibited same sex marriage on the basis of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the state constitution, the Due Process Clause of the state 
constitution, the Privacy Clause of the state constitution, and the state’s Equal Rights 
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Amendment. Similar to the Vermont analysis, it will be beneficial to understand preceding cases 
before reviewing the Andersen Court’s decision.   
 The Andersen Court under took a federal equal protection analysis. The Court ruled using 
the federal rational test. The Court found that (1) gay and lesbians had been discriminated in the 
past, (2) sexual orientation was not an immutable quality, (3) as a class, gays/lesbians were not 
politically powerless, and (4) there were no economic disadvantages to the class. These four 
criteria are also used in federal equal protection jurisprudence.25 This federal analysis employed 
by the state supreme court can be traced back to cases such as Hanson v. Hutt and Schroeder v. 
Weighall. The Andersen court also used a federal substantive due process review and again ruled 
based on rational basis. The Court in Andersen found, there was a reasonable ground to limit 
same-sex marriage due to the state’s interest in child-bearing and procreation. Andersen 
continued the precedential standard of the Young Court which also employed this federal 
framework. With the Andersen court following both federal equal protection and due process 
reviews, the Court ruled using the federal three-tiered scrutiny and ultimately came to a rational 
basis review.  
 Before reviewing the Andersen decision, we will look at these precedential cases. The 
cases are broken up based on the constitutional challenge. Every proceeding case uses some form 
of federal scrutiny. Which means when the Andersen Court ruled based off the rational basis test, 
the court had a long history of using the federal standards of review. 
  
  
                                                 
25 It is worth noting — and somewhat illogical — that the Andersen Court found sex as a suspect 
classification; however, sexual orientation was not even quasi-suspect. Because sexual 
orientation was not suspect in the Court’s paradigm, the Court reviewed the case using low level 
scrutiny. 
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Privileges and Immunities Precedents 
  
 To understand some of the intricacies of Washington’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
and to explain in part the Andersen court review, it is necessary to look at Hanson v. Hutt and 
Schroeder v. Weighall.  
 In Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash.2d 195 (1973), a woman filed action challenging statute 
RCW 50.20.030 disqualifying pregnant women from unemployment insurance benefits. The 
Supreme Court held that the statute violated the federal Equal Protection Clause and the state’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.  
 The Court asserted that the federal Equal Protection and the State’s Privileges and 
Immunities clauses “are substantially identical in their impact upon state legislation.” Hanson, at 
200. 
 The Court needed to determine if the Statute was discriminatory in nature. It concluded, 
“it is equally clear that only women must be barren to be eligible for and to receive 
unemployment compensation. This requirement … also places a heavier burden upon women 
who seek unemployment benefits.” Hanson, at 198. Sex is an immutable trait which the class 
members are “locked by accident of birth” Hanson, at 199. The result was that the entire class 
was relegated to an inferior legal status without regard to capabilities and characteristics of its 
individual members. The Hanson Court ruled classifications based on sex were inherently 
suspect and require strict scrutiny.  
 There was no clearly stated purpose behind the law, and with no compelling state interest 
to justify its discriminatory provisions, the Court ruled that RCW 50.20.030 violated 
Washington’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.  
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  In Schroeder v. Weighall, 179 Wash.2d 566 (2014), the Court ruled that statute RCW 
4.16.190(2), which eliminated medical malpractice actions from general tolling (halting the 
statute of limitations or timeframe in which to commence legal action) of legal actions brought 
by minors until the minor reached the age of majority, violated Washington’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. Past case law had demonstrated that Washington’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause had been equal to or affords greater protection than its federal counterpart, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See Seeley v. State, 132 Wash.2d 776, 788, 940 P.2d 
604, 609 (1997), and Grant County II, 150 Wn.2d at 812 (2005).  
 After Grant County II, the courts subjected legislation to a two-part test under the 
"privileges" of article I, section 12 analysis. First, it determined whether a challenged law grants 
a "privilege" or "immunity" for purposes of the state constitution. Grant County II, at 812. If the 
answer is yes, it must then determine whether there is a "reasonable ground" for granting that 
privilege or immunity. Grant I, at 731. 
 The benefit that RCW 4.16.190(2) conferred was limited liability -- or an immunity from 
certain suits pursued by certain plaintiffs. The Washington Supreme Court had long recognized 
that the privileges and immunities contemplated in article I, section 12 included the right to 
pursue common law causes of action in court.  Thus, at least where a cause of action derives 
from the common law, the ability to pursue it is a privilege of state citizenship triggering article 
I, section 12 and reasonable-ground analysis. A law limiting the pursuit of common law claims 
against certain defendants therefore grants those defendants an article I, section 12 "immunity.” 
The article I, section 12 reasonable ground test is more exacting than rational basis review. 
Under the reasonable-ground test a court will not hypothesize facts to justify a legislative 
distinction. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Rogers, 6 Wn.2d 31, 37- 38, 106 P.2d 598 (1940). Rather, 
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the courts will scrutinize the legislative distinction to determine whether it serves the legislature's 
stated goal. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 59 P .2d 1101 (1936). 
 The stated purpose of the law is the “goal of alleviating any medical insurance crisis” 
Schroeder, at 575. Because less than one percent of all insurance claims nationwide were made 
by adults pursuant to incidents of malpractice occurring more than eight years prior, the 
Schroeder Court ruled, “The statute is too attenuated to survive rational basis scrutiny.” 
Schroeder, at 575. Thus, the statute was struck down based on the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the state constitution.  
 The Privileges and Immunities Clause has somewhat of a double analysis. To begin each 
review, the Washington courts must rule if there is a special privilege granted to a minority, such 
as in Schroeder. If there is a special privilege granted, there is an enhanced rational basis review, 
requiring the court to establish whether the stated purpose of the law is, in fact, accomplished. If 
there is no special privilege granted, the privileges and immunities clause then becomes 
analogous — and interpretable -- to that of the federal equal protection clause. The analysis 
becomes the same as an equal protection analysis — namely, is there a fundamental right and/or 
a suspect classification? If there is a suspect classification, such as in Hanson involving sex 
discrimination, strict scrutiny is applicable. If there is no suspect classification or fundamental 
right, such as in Andersen, rational basis review is then applied.  These cases helpped lay 
groundwork for the Andersen Court – which followed federal scrutiny framework – decision 
plausible.  
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Due Process Precedent 
 The federal analysis is evident in the Andersen Courts due process review. When no 
fundamental right is at stake, rational basis review is required. This is similar to an earlier 
Washington State Supreme Court case, Young v. Konz, 91 Wash.2d 532 (1979).  
 In Young, the Court, similar to the Andersen Court, used the rigid multi-tiered analysis 
employed by the federal courts for a due process claim. The question the Young Court faced 
was, “Are the defendants denied due process under article 1, section 3, of our state constitution, 
and under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, when tried before a 
nonlawyer judge in a court of limited jurisdiction for a misdemeanor wherein a loss of liberty 
could result?” Young, at 533.  
 The Court stated it would utilize the same standards used by the federal government 
saying, “the sound approach to this case is to acknowledge and appreciate that Const. art. *539 1, 
§ 3 is the same as the federal due process clause, and federal cases ….” Young, at 538-39. 
Because there was no fundamental right involved, the Court decided this case under the rational 
basis standard of review. It found no judicial evolution of the concepts basic to fair trial which 
required adoption of a higher standard of due process than that set forth in North In Young I, 88 
Wash.2d 558 (1977).    
 Other courts have considered the same question and found non attorney judges did not 
violate due process, specifically the federal protections of the Sixth Amendment and state 
constitutional analogues. See State v. Lynch, 107 Ariz. 463, 489 P.2d 697 (1971); Treiman v. 
State ex rel. Miner, 343 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1977); Decatur v. Kushmer, 43 Ill. 2d 334, 253 N.E.2d 
425 (1969); Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1972); State v. Lindgren, 235 N.W.2d 379 
(Minn. 1975); In re Hewitt, 81 Misc.2d 202, 365 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1975); State v. Duncan, 269 S.C. 
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510, 238 S.E.2d 205 (1977); Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976); Thomas v. Justice 
Court, 538 P.2d 42(Wyo. 1975). 
 The Young Court explained, “Under our state constitution, the people have clearly vested 
the legislature with the sole authority to prescribe the jurisdiction and powers, and implicitly the 
qualifications, of justices of the peace and such other inferior courts as the legislature may 
establish.” Young, at 541 
 The people, through the constitution, have: (1) explicitly recognized and accepted justices 
of the peace as well as such inferior courts as the legislature may create; (2) vested such courts 
with the judicial power of the state; (3) authorized only the legislature (aside from the 
constitutional amendment process) to prescribe the powers, duties and jurisdiction of such 
courts; (4) established appellate jurisdiction over cases arising from such courts in the superior 
courts; and (5) provided that admission to practice law shall be a qualification only for judges of 
the superior and supreme courts. W.A. Const. art. 4, § 10 (amendment 28), W.A. Const. art. 4, § 
11, W.A. Const. art. 4, § 12, and W.A. Const. art. 4, § 17. Thus, the Court held that nonlawyer 
adjudication does not violate the right to due process. 
 This case similar to the privileges and immunities cases, help show that the Washington 
State courts used federal lever scrutiny guidelines.  
 
Andersen Decision 
  The Court began by reviewing the Appellants’ claim under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, W.A. Const. art. I. § 12. which provided: “No law shall be passed granting to 
any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which 
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporation.” Washington’s 
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Privileges and Immunities Clause is analogous to the United States Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause. During its review, the Andersen Court would apply federal standards in 
determining the level of scrutiny for the case. The federal standards applied here were also 
applied in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health 289 Conn. 135, 957 A.2d 407, (2007) and 
In Re Marriage Cases 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), all of which will be discussed later in this paper. 
With this understanding of preceding case law, a review of Andersen is necessary to understand 
if the court used the federal framework.  
 Washington’s Privileges and Immunities Clause provides no greater protection than that 
of the federal Equal Protection Clause. Andersen, at 18.  The Andersen Court needed to address 
if it would use its own particularized independent analysis or the federal equal protection 
analysis. Grant County Fire Protection District v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wash.2d 791, 83 P.3d 
419 (2004) held that an independent analysis applied under article 1, section 12 only when the 
challenged law granted privilege or immunity to a minority class — that is, in the event of 
positive favoritism. Accordingly, because DOMA did not involve the grant of a privilege or 
immunity, the question was whether members of a minority class were discriminated against. 
The Court applied “the same constitutional analysis that applies under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution.” Andersen, at 18.  
            In order to trigger a heightened level of scrutiny (strict scrutiny), the plaintiffs first 
attempted to demonstrate they were a suspect classification. To quickly summarize, to qualify as 
a suspect classification, the class must have suffered a history of discrimination, have as the 
characteristic defining the class an obvious, immutable trait that frequently bears no relation to 
ability to perform or contribute to society, and show that it is a minority or politically powerless 
class. Hanson v. Hutt, at 599.  
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 The parties did not dispute that gay and lesbian persons had been historically 
discriminated against. However, the parties disputed whether homosexuality was immutable. 
Both Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) and High Tech 
Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) held that gay and lesbian 
persons did not constitute a suspect classification because homosexuality is not an immutable 
trait. The Andersen Court concluded the Plaintiffs did not show that homosexuality was an 
immutable trait. The plaintiffs cited “no authority or any secondary authority or studies in 
support of their conclusion.” Andersen, at 20.  
            Lastly, there had been recent legislative amendments to the Washington State Law 
Against Discrimination to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.26 Engrossed 
Substitute H.B. 2661, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). The Court found Washington showed 
that, as a class, gay and lesbian persons were not powerless but, instead, exercised increasing 
political power. The plaintiffs, the Court found, did not demonstrate they were members of a 
suspect classification. Courts around the United States had also reached similar conclusions, see, 
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818, (11th Cir. 2004), 
Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 632 (2nd Cir. 1998), Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 
(8th Cir. 1996). Therefore, strict scrutiny was not applied based on a suspect classification 
            Strict scrutiny review would, of course, be required where due process analysis involved 
a fundamental right. The fundamental right to marry “is part of the fundamental ‘right of 
privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: Zablocki v Redhail, 434 
                                                 
26 In addition, the Intervenors point to evidence that a number of openly gay candidates were 
elected to national, state, and local offices in 2004. Along with amendments to chapter RCW 
49.60 to add sexual orientation to the laws against discrimination. 
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U.S. 374, 384, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978).27 For a fundamental right to exist, it must be 
“objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ … and implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, (1997).  
  A brief review of the history and tradition of marriage was central to the determination of 
whether same-sex marriage was a fundamental right. As pointed out by the Andersen Court, 
prior to and after statehood, “state laws reflected the common law of marriage between a man 
and women … Laws of 1854 there really is no serious claim that the early statutes defined 
anything but opposite-sex marriage.” Andersen, at 29. The fundamental right to marriage had 
been linked to the explicit purpose of procreation, childbirth, and child-rearing. See, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), Zablocki, at 383-84, and Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 
211 (1888).  
            The Andersen Court acknowledged “marriage is an evolving evolution … However, 
although marriage has evolved, it has not included a history and tradition of same sex marriage 
in this nation or in Washington State.” Andersen, at 30. The Andersen Court concluded that the 
appropriate standard of review was rational basis review. 
  The stated purpose of DOMA was “to reaffirm the State’s historical commitment to the 
institution of marriage between a man and a woman.” Andersen, at 35. The State reasoned that 
                                                 
27 The reader should note that although the Zablocki Court links the right of privacy to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause, it would be even more accurate to reference the 
Ninth Amendment’s right of privacy as being under the aegis of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which incorporates the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights and makes those protections applicable 
to not only federal action but any governmental action — state, municipal, county, etc. 
Furthermore, the reader will recall that until passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of 
Rights only protected against federal governmental action. 
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partners in a marriage were expected to engage in exclusive sexual relations “with probable 
result and paternity presumed.” Andersen, at 35.  
            The Andersen Court explained, “The fact that all opposite-sex couples do not have 
children and that same-sex couples raise children and have children with third party assistance or 
through adoption does not mean that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples lacks a rational 
basis. Such over- or under-inclusiveness does not defeat finding a rational basis” Andersen, at 
36.28 Given the rational relationship standard, and that the legislature was provided with 
testimony that children thrive in opposite-sex marriage environments, the legislature acted to 
limit the status of marriage. The legislature was entitled to believe that limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples would promote procreation and child-rearing in a “traditional” nuclear 
family where children tend to thrive. The Court reiterated “the rational basis standard is a highly 
deferential standard.” Andersen, at 39, “highly deferential” being an operative term.  
The Justices found that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples furthered the State’s interests 
in procreation and encouraged families with a mother and father and children, all of whom were 
biologically related. The Plaintiffs, therefore, had not established that DOMA was 
unconstitutional under article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution. 
 The Plaintiffs maintained that DOMA violated their right to due process W.A. Const. art. 
I, § 3. which states in relevant part: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.” The Court relied on its previous conclusion under the federal 
constitutional analysis regarding the presence (or absence) of a fundamental right. It ruled “The 
fundamental right to marriage does not include the right to same-sex marriage. In the absence of 
                                                 
28 Strict scrutiny analysis rarely, if ever, permits any statute that is over-inclusive or under-
inclusive to pass constitutional muster. 
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a fundamental right at stake, the due process inquiry is whether the law bears a reasonable 
relationship to a legitimate state interest.” Andersen, at 43. 
 As the Court previously concluded under the equal protection analysis, DOMA satisfied 
rational basis review and was thus not violative of article 1, section 3 based upon substantive due 
process.29  
 
Conclusion 
 Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Due Process Clause, the Andersen 
Court used an identical analysis to that used by the federal courts. The Court reviewed a history 
of discrimination, immutability of the class, and political powerlessness. It found that because 
there was no fundamental right and because same-sex persons are not a suspect classification, the 
matter was reviewable on a rational basis standard of review. This low threshold was upheld 
because the law was rationally related to the state’s putative interest in procreation and child-
bearing. 
 Three cases which reviewed the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Washington 
Constitution: Andersen, Hanson, and Schroeder all used federal review standards. To begin each 
review, the Washington courts must rule if there was a special privilege granted to a minority, 
such as in Schroeder. If there is a special privilege granted, there is an enhanced rational basis 
review, requiring the court to establish whether the stated purpose of the law was, in fact, 
accomplished. If there was no special privilege granted, the privileges and immunities clause 
                                                 
29 Procedural due process, something very different from substantive due process and something 
not relevant to same-sex jurisprudence, typically is limited to a citizen’s right to be heard (a 
zoning hearing, for example) or certain government employees’ rights to a hearing before 
employment termination can legally occur 
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then becomes analogous — and interpretable -- to that of the federal equal protection clause. The 
analysis becomes the same as an equal protection analysis — namely, is there a fundamental 
right and/or a suspect classification? If there is a suspect classification, such as in Hanson 
involving sex discrimination, strict scrutiny is applicable. If there is no suspect classification or 
fundamental right, such as in Andersen, rational basis review is then applied. The Andersen court 
acknowledged precedent when it stated, “As we concluded in Grant County II, the concern 
underlying the state privileges and immunities clause, unlike that of the equal protection clause, 
is undue favoritism, not discrimination, and the concern about favoritism arises where a privilege 
or immunity is granted to a minority class (“a few”).” As the Andersen court stated above, there 
was no positive grant of favoritism to a minority and neither a suspect classification nor a 
fundamental right was implicated. Thus, the Andersen Court reviewed the case under standard 
federal equal protection analysis. In this analysis, the court had to review if sexual orientation 
was a suspect or inherently suspect classification. To determine this, it used the federal standard 
of review.   
 In both Andersen, and Young II, the courts used the same analysis employed in federal 
due process claims. In both cases, there were no fundamental rights at stake, which allowed the 
courts to proceed under a rational basis analysis. In Young II the legislature had the power to 
create nonlawyer judges, which was reasonably related to filling lower level vacant judgeships 
responsible for adjudicating petty criminal violations. Washington followed In Young’s 
footsteps, ruling based on the federal standard of review while reviewing state due process 
claims. 
 This Court had in the past, and in Andersen, been shaped and has adopted the federal 
levels of scrutiny.  
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Chapter 4: Connecticut 
Introduction 
 Connecticut’s courts, like the states before, has been affected by the federal scrutiny 
framework. In a groundbreaking case, Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 
135, 957 A.2d 407 (2007), the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that allowing same-sex couples 
to form same-sex unions, but not marriages, violated the Connecticut Constitution. In Kerrigan, 
the Court found that same-sex couples constituted a quasi-suspect classification, the first ruling 
finding a “quasi-suspect” classification involving homosexuals and same-sex couples by a state 
appellate or federal court, triggering intermediate scrutiny. The Connecticut court was affected 
by the federal court system in two ways. It used the federal scrutiny framework, and a federal 
analysis which employed the four qualifications of a quasi-suspect/suspect classification 
employed with federal equal protection claims to determine the applicable scrutiny.30  
                                                 
30 The United States Supreme Court, however, consistently has identified two factors that must 
be met, for purposes of the federal constitution, if a group is to be accorded such status. The two 
required factors are as follows: (1) the group has suffered a history of invidious discrimination; 
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–32 (1996); Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); and (2) the characteristics that distinguish the group’s 
membership bears ‘‘no relation to [their] ability to perform or contribute to society.’’ The United 
States Supreme Court also has cited two additional considerations that may be relevant in 
determining whether statutory provisions pertaining to a particular group are subject to 
heightened scrutiny. These two additional considerations are as follows: (1) the characteristic 
that defines the members of the class as a discrete group is immutable or otherwise not within 
their control; See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); and (2) the group is ‘‘a 
minority or politically powerless.’’ At the time the United States Supreme Court had recognized 
two quasi-suspect classes, namely, sex  (see, e.g., Frontiero, at 687) and illegitimacy (See, e.g., 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505–506, (1976)). It bears emphasis, however, that the United 
States Supreme Court had placed far greater weight—indeed, it invariably has placed dispositive 
weight—on the first two factors: whether the group has been the subject of long-standing and 
invidious discrimination and whether the group’s distinguishing characteristic bears any relation 
to the ability of the group members to perform or function in society. 
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 The Connecticut Supreme Court’s adoption of federal intermediate scrutiny in Kerrigan 
followed an older body of case law in which it adopted the federal scrutiny framework in non-
same-sex marriage cases. This is illustrated by, Eielson v. Park, 179 Conn. 552 (1980), and 
Contractor’s Supply of Waterbury, LLC v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 283 
Conn. 86, 925 A.2d 1071 (2007).   
 In Eielson, a class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the state statute 
establishing a graduated salary system for superior court judges, the Court recognized that there 
is legislation that involves rights that may be significant -- though not fundamental-- or 
classifications that are sensitive -- though not suspect -- that may demand some form of 
intermediate review. The Court is implicitly stating it is working through federal scrutiny by 
using this federal equal protection language. The Court was reluctant to create intermediate 
scrutiny, and reviewed the case on rational basis grounds. It cited, “We perceive no basis, 
however, in this case, for departure from the criterion of rational basis for the appraisal of the 
constitutionality of this statute.” Eielson, at 556. Here the court explicitly mention the federal 
scrutiny standard.  
  In Contractor’s Supply of Waterbury, LLC a case involving economic regulation, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, once again made reference to “important rights.” The Contractor’s 
Supply of Waterbury Court was unwilling to create the third-tier of intermediate scrutiny. The 
Court concluded “the plaintiff has not demonstrated, however, that it is a member of a politically 
unpopular group, and this court never has recognized mere property rights to be “important” 
rights for purposes of equal protection analysis. Instead, the plaintiff's claim fits squarely within 
the category of claims traditionally accorded rational basis scrutiny — a claim based on a 
classification created by a purely economic regulation, not involving a suspect class or a 
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fundamental right.” Contractor’s Supply of Waterbury, LLC , at 94. The Court explicitly used 
the federal scrutiny framework, and stated that it did not want to grant intermediate scrutiny and 
instead used the rational basis test. 
 These cases partially laid the framework for the decision in Kerrigan. They laid the 
groundwork because a) the courts before establish that it follows the federal scrutiny framework 
and b) the court before has wrestle with adopting and use of intermediate federal scrutiny. 
 
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health Decision 
  The Plaintiff challenged the ban on same-sex marriage under Article one § 20, of the 
Connecticut constitution, which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]o person shall be denied the 
equal protection of the law . . . .’’ C.T. Const. art. 1. § 20. This provision prohibits the state from 
treating similarly situated persons differently without sufficient reason to do so. 
  Connecticut’s Supreme Court had never considered whether classifications that 
discriminate against gay persons were subject to heightened scrutiny under the equal protection 
provisions of the state constitution. The lower appellate state court had recently addressed the 
issue in State v. John M., 94 Conn. App. 667, 894 A.2d 376 (2006) rev’d on other grounds by 
State v. John F.M., 285 Conn. 528, 940 A.2d 755 (2008),  which concluded that such 
classifications were entitled only to rational basis review on the basis of its reading of federal and 
sister state precedent. John M., at 678–85. For several reasons, the Kerrigan Court was not 
persuaded by the lower appellate court’s analysis: “in John F.M., the Appellate Court decided the 
issue under the federal constitution, not the state constitution. See, 678–79. Second, the Appellate 
Court did not apply the federal four-pronged test for determining whether a group is entitled to 
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heightened protection but, rather, relied solely on case law from other jurisdictions.” Kerrigan, at 
145.  
 The Court looked first at homosexuals’ history of discrimination. For centuries, the 
prevailing attitude toward gay persons has been ‘‘one of strong disapproval, frequent ostracism, 
social and legal discrimination, and at times ferocious punishment.’’ R. Posner, Sex and Reason 
(Harvard University Press 1992) c. 11, p. 291. The Kerrigan Court stated, “Gay persons have 
been subjected to such severe and sustained discrimination because of our culture’s long-
standing intolerance of intimate homosexual conduct.” Kerrigan, at 142. As the United States 
Supreme Court had recognized, ‘‘[p]roscriptions against [homosexual sodomy] had ancient 
roots.’’ Bowers, at 192. 
  Next, the Court discussed whether sexual orientation was related to a person’s ability to 
participate or contribute to society. The Court explained that it was the public policy of 
Connecticut that sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual’s ability to raise children. 
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-727 (permitting same sex couples to adopt children); See also 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-727a (3) (finding of General Assembly that best interests of child are 
promoted whenever child is part of ‘‘loving, supportive and stable family’’ without reference to 
sexual preference of parents); to an individual’s capacity to enter into relationships analogous to 
marriage; See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-38aa-46b38pp (granting same sex couples all rights and 
privileges afforded to opposite sex couples who enter into marriage); and to an individual’s 
ability otherwise to participate fully in every important economic and social institution and 
activity that the government regulates.”  
  The third component the Court used to determine the level of scrutiny was the 
immutability of the group’s distinguishing characteristic. Sexual intimacy is ‘‘a sensitive, key 
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relationship of human existence, central to . . . the development of human personality . . . .’’ 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). Thus, the United States Supreme Court 
had recognized that, because ‘‘the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, 
consensual conduct . . . [represents] an integral part of human freedom.’’ Lawrence, at 576–77. 
  The Kerrigan Court claimed, “In view of the central role that sexual orientation plays in a 
person’s fundamental right to self-determination, we fully agree with the plaintiffs that their 
sexual orientation represents the kind of distinguishing characteristic that defines them as a 
discrete group for purposes of determining whether that group should be afforded heightened 
protection under the equal protection provisions of the state constitution.” Kerrigan, at 143. 
 Lastly, the Court determined if homosexuals as a group were politically powerless. The 
Court determined that “When this approach is applied to the present case, there is no doubt that 
gay persons clearly comprise a distinct minority of the population.” Kerrigan, at 143. Along 
those lines the Court found that the relatively modest political influence that gay persons 
possessed was insufficient to rectify the invidious discrimination to which they had been 
subjected to for so long. “Like the political gains that women had made prior to their recognition 
as a quasi-suspect class, the political advances that gay persons have attained afford them 
inadequate protection, standing alone, in view of the deep-seated and pernicious nature of the 
prejudice and antipathy that they continue to face. Today, moreover, women have far greater 
political power than gay persons, yet they continue to be accorded status as a quasi-suspect 
class.” See Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools, 138 N.M. 331 (2005). 
 The Court determined, “Because of the long history of discrimination that gay persons 
have faced, there is a high likelihood that the creation of a second, separate legal entity for same-
sex couples will be viewed as reflecting an official state policy that that entity is inferior to 
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marriage, and that the committed relationships of same sex couples are of a lesser stature than 
comparable relationships of opposite sex couples.” Consequently, ‘‘retaining the designation of 
marriage exclusively for opposite-sex couples and providing only a separate and distinct 
designation for same-sex couples may well have the effect of perpetuating a more general 
premise [namely] . . . that gay individuals and same-sex couples are in some respects ‘second-
class citizens’ who may, under the law, be treated differently from, and less favorably than, 
heterosexual individuals or opposite-sex couples.’’ Kerrigan, at 148 See also In re Marriage 
Cases, at 784–85;  Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 440 Mass. 333 (2003).  This reasoning 
echoes the famous quote from Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 481 (1954) that separate 
schools based on race by virtue of being separate were “inherently unequal,” Brown, at 495 -- 
reversing the 1896 Supreme Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), wherein 
the Court found separate but equal passenger train cars were not violative of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Plessy, at 547.  Civil unions, the Kerrigan Court believed, were inherently unequal 
compared to state-sanctioned marital relationships.  Thus, the Court adopted the federal 
intermediate scrutiny standard, which followed the the trajectory started by Eielson and 
Contractor’s Supply of Waterbury. 
 The burden of proof was demanding, and it rested entirely on the state. The state had to 
show at a minimum that the challenged classification served important governmental objectives 
and that the discriminatory means employed were substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.  The justification must be genuine -- not hypothesized or invented post hoc in 
response to the litigation -- and it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different 
talents, capacities, or preferences of [the groups being classified].’’ United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 532–33 (1996). The defendants posited two essential reasons why the legislature had 
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prohibited same sex marriage: (1) to promote uniformity and consistency with the laws of other 
jurisdictions; and (2) to preserve the traditional definition of marriage as a union between one 
man and one woman.  
 The Court found the first proffered justification -- that is, uniformity and consistency with 
other state and federal laws -- might be rationally related to the state’s interest in limiting 
marriage to opposite sex couples, but it could not withstand heightened scrutiny. Although the 
defendants maintained this reason was sufficient to satisfy their demanding burden, they had 
identified no precedent in support of their claim. Indeed, beyond the mere assertion that 
uniformity and consistency with the laws of other jurisdictions represents a truly important 
governmental interest, the defendants had offered no reason why that was so.  
 Secondly, when tradition is offered to justify preserving a statutory scheme that has been 
challenged on equal protection grounds, the court needed to determine whether the reasons 
underlying that tradition were sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements.  
 The Kerrigan Court quoted U.S. Supreme Court Blackmun’s famous dissent in Bowers 
(upholding the criminalization of homosexual sex) when he stated, “Tradition alone never can 
provide sufficient cause to discriminate against a protected class, for ‘‘[neither] the length of 
time a majority [of the populace] has held its convictions [nor] the passions with which it 
defends them can withdraw legislation from [the] [c]ourt’s scrutiny.’’ Bowers, at 210. 
 The Court concluded “Moral disapproval alone, however, is insufficient reason to benefit 
one group and not another because statutory classifications cannot be drawn for the purpose of 
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’’ Kerrigan, at 156. 
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Conclusion 
 The Connecticut court system adopted and used the federal court’s three-tiered scrutiny 
system. This is evident from Kerrigan citing cases over thirty years old using the federal rational 
basis review. The Connecticut Court in Kerrigan used federal scrutiny, but also used federal 
guiding principles to determine the applicable level of scrutiny. Although the Kerrigan Court was 
shaped by federal standards, it still came to a novel conclusion. It was the first state or federal 
appellate court to use the intermediate scrutiny produced by the federal government for quasi-
suspect classifications. This is also evident by the evolution presented above by the preceding 
cases.  
Chapter 5: California 
Introduction  
  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), was a California Supreme Court case (a 
consolidation of six related cases)31 where the Court held that laws treating classes of persons 
differently based on sexual orientation should be subject to strict scrutiny, and that an existing 
statute and initiative measure limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the rights of 
same-sex couples under the California Due Process and Equal Protection clauses and may not be 
used to preclude same-sex marriage.  California presents a clear case study of a state supreme 
                                                 
31 City and County of San Francisco v. State of California (A110449 [Super. Ct. S.F. City & 
County, No. CGC-04-429539]); Tyler v. State of California (A110450 [Super. Ct. L.A. County, 
No. BS-088506]); Woo v. Lockyer (A110451 [Super. Ct. S.F. City & County, No. CPF-04-
504038]); Clinton v. State of California (A110463 [Super. Ct. S.F. City & County, No. CGC-04-
429548]); Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund v. City and County of San 
Francisco (A110651 [Super. Ct. S.F. City & County, No. CPF-04-503943]); Campaign for 
California Families v. Newsom (A110652 [Super. Ct. S.F. City & County, No. CGC-04-
428794]). 
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court adopting and employing the federal strict scrutiny standard to interpret the state 
constitution in its key same-sex marriage case. The California Supreme Court in In re Marriage 
Cases undertook a traditional federal equal protection and due process review.  
 In using this standard, the Court followed a series of earlier cases that had adopted and 
applied federal scrutiny standards to state clauses. How it did so is evident if one examines the In 
re Marriage Cases ruling in light of three important precedents: Blumenthal v. Board of Medical 
Examiners,57 Cal.2d 288 (1962), In re King, 150 Cal. App. 3d 304 (1983), and Darces v. 
Woods, 35 Cal. 3d 871 (1984). 
 
Case law preceding In re Marriage Cases 
 Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners is an early case using the federal 
government’s scrutiny framework to decide an equal protection claim under the state 
constitution. The Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the Board of Medical 
Examiners to register him as a dispensing optician. He was denied because he hadn’t completed 
five years’ experience taking facial measurements and fitting / adjusting lenses in the state. He 
did have five years out-of-state experience. The board found the Petitioner had not met the 
requirement of good moral character imposed by subdivision (b) Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2552. 
 The Petitioner admitted that he did not meet the experience requirement of subdivision 
(a) of section 2552 of the Business and Professions Code, but urged that, “this subdivision is 
unconstitutional on the ground that it imposes inequalities prohibited by the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, sections 11 
and 21 of the Constitution of the State of California.” 
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 The Court undertook an analysis and review under the state constitution. It found, 
“Section 2552, subdivision (a) discriminates between persons who have served the requisite five-
year apprenticeship or who have been licensed for five years in another state and other persons 
regardless of their qualifications.” To conflict with constitutional provisions, the discrimination 
must be actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary. The Court invoked the rational basis 
test to invalidate Section 2552. Stating “A discrimination, however, that bears no reasonable 
relation to a proper legislative objective is invalid.” Blumenthal, at 764. 
 The Court did not believe that, “the Legislature could not have reasonably concluded that 
training as a dispensing optician acquired in a physician's office … would lead to the elimination 
of abuses in the field.” 
 By stating, “A discrimination, however, that bears no reasonable relation to a proper 
legislative objective is invalid” the court explicitly used the federal rational basis tests. 
 Eight years later in In re King, the Court used explicit federal equal protection language 
and federal scrutiny framework to review a challenge under its own constitution. However, 
rather than following Blumenthal by using the rational basis test, it shifted to adopt strict 
scrutiny.  
 On February 7, 1967, Clennon Washington King was convicted of failure to support his 
children in violation of Penal Code section. Section 270 of the Penal Code, in prescribed varying 
penalties for violation, and distinguished between two "categories" or "classifications" of non-
supporting fathers. The Plaintiff contested that these classifications violated the State’s Equal 
Protection Clause.  
 The Court described the protections afforded by the California Constitution, stating “It is 
basic that the guarantees of equal protection embodied in article I, sections 11 and 21, of the 
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California Constitution, prohibit the state from arbitrarily discriminating among persons’ subject 
to its jurisdiction. This principle, of course, does not preclude the state from drawing any 
distinctions between different groups of individuals, but does require that, at a minimum, 
classifications which are created bear a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose.”  In 
re King, at 482. This language has been used in numerous federal cases before.32 
 The Court used the federal framework for scrutiny, in this case citing, "in cases involving 
`suspect classifications' or touching on `fundamental interests' ... the state bears the burden of 
establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law, but that distinctions 
drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." The Court is blatantly mirroring the 
federal government’s strict scrutiny instead of creating its own framework.   
 The Court held “insofar as the section punishes nonsupporting fathers who ‘remain out of 
the state for 30 days’ more heavily than nonsupporting fathers who are within California, this 
penal provision establishes a classification not sufficiently related to any legitimate 
governmental objective, and as such violates the equal protection clause of our Constitution.” In 
re King, at 488. 
 In re King evolved from previous cases and reviewed the California Equal Protection 
Clause based on the strict scrutiny framework, while borrowing the exact wording from federal 
courts.  
                                                 
32 Rinaldi v. Yaeger 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966); Baxstrom v. Herold (1966) 383 U.S. 107, 111 
(1966). 
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 Fifteen years after In re King, the California Court in Darces v. Woods – rather than 
simply following its own precedent from In re King -- used the federal levels of scrutiny, but 
employed federal guidelines to determine which level of scrutiny was applicable in the case.  
 In Darces, the Court faced the question “May the state disadvantage citizen children 
eligible for governmental assistance on the basis that they live with their brothers and sisters who 
are undocumented aliens?” The Appellant's constitutional contention was that the challenged 
practice penalizes her eligible children solely on the basis of their status as siblings of 
undocumented aliens in violation of equal protection under the state and federal Constitutions. 
The Court took the claim under the state equal protection grounds. The Court stated, “The 
guarantees of equal protection embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution “compel[ ] recognition of the 
proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law 
receive like treatment.” Darces, at 327. The Court linked California’s Equal Protection Clause 
with the federal government’s Equal Protection Clause, which implies the Court views them 
equally.  The Court described the difference between the federal scrutiny standards.33 
 Not only did the Court use the federal scrutiny framework, but also used federal standard 
guidelines to determine the proper level of scrutiny. The Court first looked at “the nature of the 
classification,” and if the party is similarly situated to the unaffected class. The Court found, 
                                                 
33  The Court describing federal scrutiny stated, “This principle, of course, does not preclude the 
state from drawing any distinctions between different groups of individuals, but does require 
that, at a minimum, classifications which are created bear a rational relationship to a legitimate 
public purpose.” In re King, at 474. However, this deferential standard is inapplicable “ ‘in cases 
involving “suspect classifications” or touching on “fundamental interests” ․’ ”  (Ibid.)   In such 
cases “the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which 
justifies the law but that distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.”   
(Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 784–785, 87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487.) 
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“The members of both classes are similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the 
AFDC program—the relief of eligible, needy children.” Darces, at 334 
 The Court reviewed the case under strict scrutiny and stated, “The appellant has the 
burden to show a compelling state interest that is furthered by the classification he has drawn.” 
Darces, at 335. Again, using federal language, the Court found “Neither of the state interests 
advanced by respondent amounts to a constitutionally compelling state interest that justifies his 
policy and practice of underfunding those families, like appellant's, comprised of citizens and 
undocumented members.” Darces, at 341. 
 Instead of following earlier precedents of creating its own framework for choosing the 
appropriate scrutiny standard, the Darces Court used federal scrutiny review, while using federal 
guidelines to determine strict scrutiny was applicable, while also employing federal language 
along the way.  
In re Marriage Cases decision  
 In California before the In re Marriage Case, there is a distinct evolution of the adoption 
and use of the federal scrutiny framework. Early on, the Court borrowed the federal framework. 
As time went on, the California Court interpreted its Equal Protection Clause identically to that 
of the federal government. Beyond simply using federal scrutiny framework, the Court used 
federal guidelines to determine the applicable scrutiny. The In re Marriage Cases, followed 
Darces and once again used of both the federal framework and federal guidelines of determining 
scrutiny.  
 Plaintiffs contended that by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, California’s 
marriage statutes violated a number of provisions of the California Constitution. Plaintiffs 
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contended the challenged statutes violated a same-sex couples’ fundamental “right to marry,” as 
guaranteed by the Privacy, Free Speech, and Due Process Clauses of the California Constitution 
(Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 2, 7), and additionally violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7). 
 The Court undertook a review of the Plaintiff’s claim under a fundamental right. The 
California Constitution does not contain any explicit reference to a “right to marry,” however, 
past California cases established that the right to marry is a fundamental right in which 
protection is guaranteed to all persons by the California Constitution. See, e.g., Conservatorship 
of Valerie N.  40 Cal.3d 143, 161 (1985): [“The right to marriage and procreation are now 
recognized as fundamental, constitutionally protected interests.”] Williams v. Garcetti 5 Cal.4th 
561, 577 (1993): [“we have . . . recognized that ‘[t]he concept of personal liberties and 
fundamental human rights entitled to protection against overbroad intrusion or regulation by 
government.”] Ortiz v. Los Angeles Police Relief Assn. 98 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1303 (2002): 
[“under the state Constitution, the right to marry and the right of intimate association are 
virtually synonymous.”]; and In re Carrafa 77 Cal.App.3d 788, 791 (1978).  
 Most importantly in Perez, at 711 — the Court’s 1948 decision holding that the 
California statutory provisions prohibiting interracial marriage was unconstitutional — “the court 
did not characterize the constitutional right that the plaintiffs in that case sought to obtain as “a 
right to interracial marriage” and did not dismiss the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge on the 
ground that such marriages had never been permitted in California. Instead, the Perez decision 
focused on the substance of the constitutional right at issue — that is, the importance to an 
individual of the freedom “to join in marriage with the person of one’s choice” — in determining 
whether the statute impinged upon the plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional right. Characterizing 
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the constitutional right at issue as the right to same-sex marriage rather than the right to marry 
“goes beyond mere semantics. It is important both analytically and from the standpoint of 
fairness to Plaintiff’s argument that we recognize they are not seeking to create a new 
constitutional right — the right to “same-sex marriage” — or to change, modify, or (as some 
have suggested) “deinstitutionalize” the existing institution of marriage.” In re Marriage, at 53. 
 Instead, Plaintiffs argued that, properly interpreted, the state constitutional right to marry 
had to afford same-sex couples the same rights and benefits — accompanied by the same mutual 
responsibilities and obligations — as the constitutional right afforded to opposite-sex couples. 
For this reason, when the Court evaluated the constitutional issue, it directed its focus to the 
meaning and substance of the constitutional right to marry, and avoided the potentially 
misleading implications inherent in analyzing the issue in terms of “same-sex marriage.” In re 
Marriage, at 53. 
 In recent decades, there had been a fundamental and dramatic transformation in the 
state’s thinking and legal treatment of gay individuals and gay couples. The state’s policies and 
conduct regarding homosexuality recognized that “gay individuals were fully capable of entering 
into the kind of loving and enduring committed relationships that serve as the foundation of a 
family and of responsibly caring for and raising children.” In re Marriage, at 68. 
 The Court found that sections 1 and 7 of article I of the California Constitution could not 
properly be interpreted to withhold from gay individuals the same basic civil right of personal 
autonomy and liberty (including the right to establish, with the person of one’s choice, an 
officially recognized and sanctioned family) that was afforded to heterosexual couples.  
 “The personal enrichment afforded by the right to marry may be obtained by a couple 
whether or not they choose to have children, and the right to marry never has been limited to 
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those who plan or desire to have children. Indeed, in Griswold, at 479 — one of the seminal 
federal cases striking down a state law as violative of the federal constitutional right of privacy 
— the high court upheld a married couple’s right to use contraception to prevent procreation, 
demonstrating quite clearly that the promotion of procreation is not the sole or defining purpose 
of marriage.” 
 Accordingly, “we conclude that the right to marry, as embodied in article I, sections 1 
and 7 of the California Constitution, guarantees same-sex couples the same substantive 
constitutional rights as opposite-sex couples to choose one’s life partner and enter with that 
person into a committed, officially recognized, and protected family relationship that enjoys all 
of the constitutionally based incidents of marriage.” In re Marriage, at 78. 
 Next, Plaintiffs argued that by permitting only opposite-sex couples to enter into a 
relationship designated as a “marriage,” and by designating as a “domestic partnership” the 
parallel relationship into which same-sex couples were allowed to enter, the statutory scheme 
impermissibly denied same-sex couples the equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by article I, 
section 7, of the California Constitution. There are two different standards traditionally applied 
by California courts in evaluating challenges made to legislation under the equal protection 
clause-- strict scrutiny and rational basis. Hernandez v. City of Hanford 41 Cal.4th 279 (2007). 
 In the Court’s view, the statutory provisions restricting marriage to a man and a woman 
cannot be understood as having merely a disparate impact on gay persons, but instead properly 
must be viewed as directly classifying and prescribing distinct treatment on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  By definition, gay individuals are persons who are sexually attracted to persons of 
the same sex. A statute that limited the ability of same-sex couples to be intimate in the context 
of marriage unquestionably imposed different and unfavorable treatment on the basis of sexual 
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orientation. Thus, the Court had to determine whether sexual orientation should be considered a 
“suspect classification” under the California equal protection clause. 
 Orientation is a characteristic (1) that bears no relation to a person’s ability to perform or 
contribute to society, see e.g., Gay Law Students, 24 Cal.3rd 458, 488 (1977), and (2) that is 
associated with a stigma of inferiority and second-class citizenship, manifested by the group’s 
history of legal and social disabilities. See, e.g., People v. Garcia 77 Cal.4th 1269 (2000). The 
Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that “it is appropriate to reject sexual 
orientation as a suspect classification, in applying the California Constitution’s equal protection 
clause, on the ground that there is a question as to whether this characteristic is or is not 
‘immutable.’” 
 The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, reasoned “Immutability is not 
invariably required in order for a characteristic to be considered a suspect classification for equal 
protection purposes.” In re Marriage, at 97. California cases established that a person’s religion 
is a suspect classification for equal protection purposes see, e.g., Owens v. City of Signal Hill 
154 Cal.App.3d 123, 128 (1984); Williams v. Kapilow & Son, Inc. 105 Cal.App.3d 156, 161-162 
(1980), and one’s religion, of course, is not immutable but is a matter over which an individual 
has control. See also Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal.3d 288, 292 (1972). 
According to Hernandez Montiel v. I.N.S. 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) “Sexual 
orientation and sexual identity . . . are so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not 
be required to abandon them” and Egan v. Canada, 2 S.C.R. 513, 528 (1995) “whether or not 
sexual orientation is based on biological or physiological factors, which may be a matter of some 
controversy, it is a deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only 
at unacceptable personal costs.” Egan, at 528. In Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 
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446 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) the Oregon Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in a domestic 
partner benefits case, and stated that “the focus of suspect class definition is not necessarily the 
immutability of the common, class-defining characteristics, but instead the fact that such 
characteristics are historically regarded as defining distinct, socially-recognized groups that have 
been the subject of adverse social or political stereotyping or prejudice.” 446. Other scholarly 
articles had come to this same conclusion. "On that middle ground, sexual orientation, no matter 
what causes it, acquires social and political meaning through the material and symbolic activities 
of living people.” Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the 
Argument from Immutability, 46 Stan. L. REV. 503 (1994)34 “The Supreme Court's reluctance to 
define immutability in a satisfactory manner has mystified litigants” Marc R. Shapiro, Treading 
the Supreme Court’s Murky Immutability Waters, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 409, 443–44 (2003)35 
 In sum, the In Re Marriage Court concluded that statutes imposing differential treatment 
on the basis of sexual orientation must be viewed as constitutionally suspect under the California 
Constitution’s Equal Protection clause. 
 The Court determined where the law had a compelling state interest under the strict 
scrutiny test. California courts have routinely granted relief for discrimination based on sexual 
orientation under both the state’s civil code and its domestic partnership laws. The courts had 
avoided ruling on sexual orientation’s eligibility for heightened scrutiny as a suspect 
classification under state equal protection. The closest precedent dates back to 1979, when a 
                                                 
34 Reviewed three scientific theories supporting the immutability of sexual orientation and 
contending that legal arguments based upon immutability may actually be divisive and harmful 
to gay rights equal protection claims 
 
35 Suggests that courts should discard the immutability concept if immutability is defined 
narrowly as a physical inability to change 
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group of plaintiffs sued the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company, arguing the company’s 
employment discrimination against homosexuals constituted a violation of equal protection and 
thus deserved heightened scrutiny. Though the California Supreme Court agreed state equal 
protection laws against arbitrary discrimination were applicable to homosexuals, it stopped short 
of granting the suspect classification protections given to traits like race and gender. Since then, 
California’s state courts have remained mostly silent. Harvard Law Review, 122 H.L.R. 1557 at 
page 1561 (2008-09). 
 “The state bears a heavy burden of justification. In order to satisfy that strict scrutiny 
standard, the state must demonstrate not simply that there is a rational, constitutionally legitimate 
interest that supports the differential treatment at issue, but instead that the state interest is a 
constitutionally compelling one that justifies the disparate treatment prescribed by the statute in 
question” Darces v. Wood, 893-895. In Darces, defendants asserted that the common-law 
definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman is constitutionally enshrined in the 
California Constitution by virtue of language in the 1849 and 1879 Constitutions that employed 
the terms “marriage,” “wife,” and “husband” and thereby precluded the Legislature or the people 
through the statutory initiative from modifying the current statutes to permit same-sex couples to 
marry. The Court replied by stating, “section 308.5 is an initiative statute, any action by the 
Legislature redefining marriage to include same-sex couples would require a confirming vote of 
approval by the electorate, but the California Constitution imposes no constitutional bar to a 
legislative revision of the marriage statutes consistent with the requirement of voter approval” 
 The attorney general and the governor maintained that, because the institution of 
marriage traditionally (both in California and throughout most of the world) had been limited to 
a union between a man and a woman, any change in that status necessarily was a matter solely 
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for the legislative process. Thus, they suggested that the separation-of-powers doctrine precluded 
a court from modifying the traditional definition of marriage.  
 The Court explained, “On the contrary, under “the constitutional theory of ‘checks and 
balances’ that the separation-of-powers doctrine is intended to serve.” In Re marriage, at 109. “A 
court has an obligation to enforce the limitations that the California Constitution imposes upon 
legislative measures, and a court would shirk the responsibility it owes to each member of the 
public were it to consider such statutory provisions to be insulated from judicial review.” In re 
Marriage, at 109. 
 The Court concluded, “After carefully evaluating the pertinent considerations in the 
present case, we conclude that the state interest in limiting the designation of marriage 
exclusively to opposite-sex couples, and in excluding same-sex couples from access to that 
designation, cannot properly be considered a compelling state interest for equal protection 
purposes. To begin with, the limitation clearly is not necessary to preserve the rights and benefits 
of marriage currently enjoyed by opposite-sex couples. Extending access to the designation of 
marriage to same-sex couples will not deprive any opposite-sex couple or their children of any of 
the rights and benefits conferred by the marriage statutes, but simply will make the benefit of the 
marriage designation available to same-sex couples and their children.” In re Marriage, at 105. 
 The retention of the traditional definition of marriage did not constitute a state interest 
sufficiently compelling, under the strict scrutiny equal protection standard, to justify withholding 
that status from same-sex couples. Accordingly, insofar as the provisions of sections 300 and 
308.5 draw a distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples and excluded the 
latter from access to the designation of marriage, those statutes were ruled unconstitutional. 
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Conclusion  
 The California Supreme Court has been and was shaped by the federal government’s 
scrutiny standards. The Court used the three-tiered analysis and reviewed the case under strict 
scrutiny. Using this framework was nothing new, as the past case showed. In Darces, the Court 
not only used federal scrutiny, but also used a federal analysis to determine the applicable 
scrutiny. The Court used conventional federal equal protection analysis to determine if sexual 
orientation was a suspect class, and focused primarily on the history of discrimination and the 
class’s immutability — the two major components under federal analysis. The Court also used 
federal guidelines to determine applicable scrutiny. The Federal scrutiny framework has been 
intruded and stuck in the California court system.  
  
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
  
 It seems counterintuitive that state courts ruling under their respective state constitutions 
would adopt federal standards. These standards, have shaped how state courts review and decide 
cases. I have presented four state supreme court cases, which have been shaped by the federal 
tiers of scrutiny in same-sex marriage jurisprudence.  
 However, this project and question opens more doors than it closes. Chiefly, discussing 
how and why the justices ruled how they did in these specific cases. Inquiries into “why” would 
constitute a whole new project for future research. Judicial behavior is a well-studied, yet still 
relatively unknown mechanism, which is why, in this paper, I have purposefully strayed from 
asking “why.” I will briefly highlight three traditional models of judicial behavior and show that 
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trying to applying these models is an enormous undertaking which would be best suited for 
future research.  
  The Legal model, states the decisions of the Court are substantially influenced by the 
facts of the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the 
Framers, and/or precedent. The Legal Model assumes the following: judges rest their decisions 
“in significant part on the plain meaning of the pertinent language, judges construe the Framers’ 
intent in constitutional cases and legislative intent in statutory cases, and finally, the asserts that 
precedent, or stare decisis, constraints judges and endows law with temporal stability.  
 If justices behaved as the legal models suggests, they would rely solely on precedent. To 
test the legal model theory, extensive research would have to be done to shepardize previous case 
law. This would mean reviewing every case cited in the same-sex marriage case, along with 
proceeding case law, regarding the same constitutional challenges.  
 A second model for judicial behavior is the Attitudinal model. The Attitudinal model 
assumes that decision making depends on goals, rules, and situations. Judges are outcome-
oriented and have goals, but their choices and decisions depend on the rules of the game, which 
is the institutional environment. Lastly, the situation, most centrally the facts of the case at hand, 
will help guide justices’ decisions. (92-96).  
 With the knowledge at hand, it is too difficult to try and predict the state supreme court 
decisions. This model requires a massive amount of insight which I am not privileged too. It is 
difficult to guess judges’ goals, which are  personalized and individualized metrics. Similarly, we 
can assume some of the institutional environment is behind closed doors when the justices are 
deliberating.; thus, this task would be one for another thesis.   
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 Epstein and Knight incorporated rational choice institutionalism within the study of 
judicial behavior. They posited that justices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to 
achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of others.  Specifically, a 
Supreme Court justice must make interdependent choices that take account of the preferences of 
(1) his/her fellow justices, (2) the executive branch or the legislature, (3) the public. The law, by 
this account, constitutes the slow accretion of myriad bouts of “short-term strategic decision-
making”.  
 Epstein and Knight make an assumption about Supreme Court justices’ preferences that 
underlies all of the observable implications of the strategic account: “a major goal of all justices 
is to see the law reflect their preferred policy positions” (11). Recognizing that their ability to do 
so requires they make interdependent choices in relation to their colleagues, to other branches of 
government, and to the broader public, we should expect justices to act strategically and to not 
always “choose” sincerely. 
 Epstein and Knight  argue that the strategic account generates four observable 
implications that the Attitudinal model could not explain: (1) bargaining, (2) forward-thinking, 
(3) manipulating the agenda, and (4) engaging in sophisticated opinion writing. 
 Similarly, this undertaking is too difficult with the information I have collected. 
However, there are many articles, that do calculate judges’ ideal points and preferences. With 
this data, and some assumptions, one could try and infer how the justices would rule based of the 
rational choice model.  
 To use these models in trying to explain the state supreme court justices’ decision making 
would take an extreme amount of time and effort, but it could be done. Judicial behavior is 
ongoing and still relatively unsolved. Many political scientists have provided theories and 
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models to predict how judges will behave; . however, judicial behavior aside, the fact the states 
supreme courts adopted federal scrutiny in same-sex marriage jurisprudence is extremely 
interesting.  
 Equally interesting, which could possibly  be explained by inquiries into judicial 
behavior, is to scrutinize the specific outcome of each same-sex marriage case. Washington, 
Connecticut, and California all used the same federal scrutiny standards, and the same federal 
equal protection analysis guidelines, to help the courts review their respective cases; yet, each 
court came to a different conclusion regarding the level of scrutiny. Other factors besides 
precedent surely played a role. This question could hopefully be answered by exploring this 
aspect of judicial behavior. 
 In light of Brett Kavanaugh’s appointment to the Supreme Court, it seems fitting to 
briefly touch on Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ____, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609 
(2015)36. In a case first impression, the U.S. Supreme Court held that adult same-sex couples 
were allowed to equally participate in the fundamental right of marriage. The net effect was that 
any state law prohibiting same-sex marriage would be held violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, specifically the Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses of that amendment.  
 Obergefell confers a federal constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry, similar to 
how Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), created a fundamental constitutional right vís a vís the 
                                                 
36 As of June 2018, final bound volumes for the U.S. Supreme Court's United States Reports 
have been published through volume 569. Newer cases from subsequent future volumes do not 
yet have official page numbers and typically use three underscores in place of the page number. 
If a case citation in a volume after 569 is shown with a page number, the page number is based 
on unofficial reporting and is subject to change when the decision is bound and printed. 
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for an adult woman to terminate her pregnancy 
without being “unduly burdened” by state law (or federal law). A change in the membership of 
the nine members of the United States Supreme Court could easily result in the Court reversing 
Obergefell or Roe. Fundamental rights that are here today could, via Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, be gone tomorrow. As a practical matter for same-sex couples wishing to marry, 
the ultimate fight could become a fight at the state court level if the Supreme Court were to 
reverse its holding in Obergefell. This could serve as another interesting area of future study, to 
meld state precedent and judicial behavior to model the “what if.”  
 Overall, this project has identified a specific federal influence into the state court system. 
This idea of states adopting federal scrutiny is novel, with more to be discovered in the realm of 
same-sex marriage jurisprudence.  
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Obergefell v. Hodges 
On the back of its decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick in 1986 (allowing for the criminalization of 
homosexual sex among consenting adults), and more importantly the explicit reversal of Bowers 
by Lawrence v. Texas in 2003 (holding that homosexual sex among consenting adults is a 
fundamental constitutional right), the United States Supreme Court created a fundamental right 
to same-sex marriage in 2015. In the seminal case of Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court 
made two constitutional realities abundantly clear:  both the Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment mandated that state governments (and by way of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the federal government) grant same-sex couples the same 
right to marry as afforded opposite-sex couples. 
 Before Obergefell, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in United States v. Windsor, 
570 U.S. 744 (2013), held that section three of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment because it harmed same-sex couples and their children, 
but he did not expressly address the constitutionality of state bans on same-sex marriage. Relying 
 II 
on Windsor, nearly thirty district courts invalidated these restrictions, and four of the thirteen 
federal appellate courts affirmed those district-court judgments, holding that state bans violated 
the Due Process Clause and/or the Equal Protection Clause. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit remained an outlier, however, and reversed federal district-court decisions overturning 
the state bans.  (The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has jurisdiction over 
federal appeals arising from the states of Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee).  The U.S. 
Supreme Court hears approximately one hundred cases yearly, and high priority is given to case-
scenarios where there is a split of authority between or among the thirteen federal courts of 
appeal.  It was with this forgoing backdrop that the Supreme Court was faced when resolving 
Obergefell in June of 2015. Implementing Marriage Equality In America, Duke Law Journal, 65 
L.R. 25 (Dec. 2015).  This scholarly journal article highlights the split of authority that caused 
the U.S. Supreme Court to hear Obergefell and render a decision that all thirteen federal 
appellate courts would be required to follow, thus providing uniformity among the appellate 
courts with respect to same-sex marriage. 
 Because the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is the central backdrop in the lead-up to 
and the impetus for Obergefell, an understanding of that federal statute and the constitutional 
provisions relevant thereto must be discussed.  Article IV, Section 1, The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the United States Constitution, mandates that every state give full faith and credit to a 
sister state’s law (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.). 
Accordingly, a marriage occurring in Wyoming must be given legal recognition by 
Wisconsin, even if that Wyoming marriage would not otherwise be legally viable (or possible) in 
Wisconsin. For example, Wisconsin could have a law requiring all nuptial parties to be a certain 
minimum age that is higher than that required in Wyoming.  Nonetheless, the marriage between 
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an 18-year-old groom and 17-year-old bride in Wyoming must be recognized by Wisconsin, 
even though Wisconsin would not permit the marriage of those same individuals in its 
jurisdiction.  Because of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, same-sex couples could be married in 
a state like Vermont (allowing same-sex marriage years before Obergefell), and then relocate to 
another state that otherwise prohibited same-sex marriage within its own 
boundaries.  Nonetheless, that later state would have to afford legal recognition and the legal 
rights associated with marriage to the same-sex couple married in Vermont.  This caused an 
uproar among the so-called Red States, as well as the vast majority of states that did not permit 
same-sex couples to marry.   
 To address this concern, the U.S. congress passed DOMA, which provided that no state 
was required -- pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution — to legally 
recognize marriages occurring outside its borders.  The Congress was granted this authority by 
Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution, which reads: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in 
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the 
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof [Emphasis added].  With the passage of 
DOMA, enacted in September of 1996, the Congress “prescribe[d]” the constitutional medicine 
to remedy the perceived malady of requiring states to recognized same-sex marriages that 
transpired outside its boundaries.  DOMA set the table for the Obergefell dinner party, as did the 
history of the institution of marriage.        
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Basis for the Obergefell Holding        
History 
 The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. The institution—even as 
confined to opposite-sex relations—has evolved over time. For example, marriage was once 
viewed as an arrangement by the couple’s parents based on political, religious, and financial 
concerns; but by the time of the Nation’s founding, it was understood to be a voluntary contract 
between a man and a woman. See N. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 
9–17 (2000); S. Coontz, Marriage, A History 15–16 (2005). Indeed, “changing understandings of 
marriage are characteristic of a nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to 
new generations, often through perspectives that begin with pleas or protests and then are 
considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.” Obergefell, at 7. 
  This dynamic was seen in the experiences with the rights of gays and lesbians. Until the 
mid-20th century, same-sex intimacy long had been condemned as immoral by the state in most 
Western nations, a belief often embodied in both civil and criminal laws. Same-sex intimacy 
remained a crime in many states; gays and lesbians were prohibited from most government 
employment, barred from military service, excluded under immigration laws, targeted by police, 
and burdened in their rights to associate. See Brief of the Organization of American Historians as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___, (2015) (Nos. 14-
556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) In the late 20th century, following substantial cultural and political 
developments, same-sex couples began to lead more open and public lives, as well as establish 
families. This development was followed by an extensive discussion of the issue in both the 
public and private sectors, and by a shift in public attitudes toward greater tolerance. 
 
 V 
Case law 
 Against this cultural and historical background, the nascent, increasingly important legal 
question of same-sex marriage arose. In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held Hawaii’s law 
restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted a classification on the basis of sex and 
was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr v. Lewin 74 Haw. 
645, 852 P.2d 44 (1993). The new and widespread discussion of the subject led other states to 
take various actions. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held the State’s Constitution 
guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry. See Goodridge. After that ruling, some 
additional states granted marriage rights to same-sex couples, either through judicial or 
legislative processes. By the spring of 2011, for the first time in United States history, a majority 
of Americans were in favor of gay marriage. Gallop Poll, Publication Date:  May 20, 2011.  For 
the sake of comparison, a few years later, a 2013 Gallup Poll found that 87% of the nation 
approved of interracial marriage.   
 In Windsor, the Court invalidated DOMA to the extent it barred the federal government 
from treating same-sex marriages as valid even when they were lawful in the states where they 
were licensed (occurred). DOMA, the Court held, impermissibly disparaged those same-sex 
couples “who wanted to affirm their commitment to one another before their children, their 
family, their friends, and their community.” Windsor at 14. After years of litigation, legislation, 
referenda, and the discussions that attended these public acts, the fifty states now are roughly 
equally divided on the issue of same-sex marriage. See Office of the Atty. Gen. of Maryland, The 
State of Marriage Equality in America, State-by-State Supp. (2015). In fact, at the apotheosis of 
state-level pushback on same-sex marriage, thirty-one states had laws or state constitutional 
amendments proscribing the same.  
 VI 
Due Process 
 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall “deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” In addition, these liberties extend 
to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate 
choices that define personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 
(1972); Griswold, at 484–486. 
 The Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. In Loving, at 
12 which invalidated bans on interracial marriages, a unanimous Court held that marriage is “one 
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” The Court 
reaffirmed that holding in Zablocki, at 384 , which held the right to marry was burdened by a law 
prohibiting fathers who were behind on child support from marrying. The Court again applied 
this principle in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987), which held the right to marry was 
abridged by regulations limiting the privilege of prison inmates to marry. Over time and in other 
contexts, the Court has reiterated that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process 
Clause. See, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 116 (1996); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. 
LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639–640 (1974); Griswold, at 486; Skinner, at 541; Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 The Court, like many institutions, has made assumptions defined by the world and time 
of which it is a part. This was evident in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972), a one-line 
summary decision issued in 1972 by the United States Supreme Court, holding the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal question — and was 
therefore unworthy of review. This flawed analysis compelled the Obergefell Court, forty-three 
years later to the conclusion that, not only was same-sex marriage a federal question screaming 
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for attention, but that same-sex couples had a constitutionally-given right to marry. The four 
principles and traditions to be discussed herein demonstrate that the reasons marriage is 
fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples. Similar to 
choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of 
which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among the most 
intimate that individuals can make. 
  The first principle on which marriage is predicated is that two persons walking together 
in life’s journey can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is 
true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation. Obergefell, at 13. 
  A second principle in the Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental 
because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed 
individuals. This point was central to Griswold, “Marriage is a coming together for better or for 
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. As this Court held in 
Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate 
association.” Obergefell, at 13-14 
 A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families, 
and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. See 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer, at 399. By giving recognition and legal 
structure to their parents’ relationship, marriage allows children “to understand the integrity and 
closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their 
daily lives.” Windsor,  at at 23. Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important to 
children’s best interests. See Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici 
Curiae 22–27. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise 
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of the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their 
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. The constitutional 
marriage right has many aspects, of which childbearing is only one. Obergefell, at 14-15. 
 Fourth and finally, this Court’s precedent and the nation’s traditions make clear that 
marriage is a keystone of our social order. In Maynard, at 211, the Court, explained that marriage 
is “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization 
nor progress.” 
 Indeed, while the States are generally free to vary the benefits they confer on all married 
couples, they have throughout our history made marriage the basis for an expanding list of 
governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities. Same-sex couples are consigned to an 
instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives. As the State 
itself makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from 
that status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. 
Obergefell, at 22. 
 These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right 
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that 
liberty. The Court held that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry no 
differently than opposite-sex couples. 
 
Obergefell Conclusion  
 The public response to the Court’s decision was immediate and overwhelmingly positive. 
Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, California Law Review, 104 L.R. 1207 
(2015). The United States Supreme Court did not technically create a new fundamental right of 
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same-sex marriage. Instead, the Court concluded that because there is a fundamental right to 
marry, same-sex couples must be allowed to participate. This was a broad sweeping opinion by 
Justice Kennedy. Kennedy evoked grandiose language about fundamental rights and dignity for 
all, which could have implications beyond Obergefell. In A new Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell 
v. Hodges, Harvard Law Review, 129 L.R. 147 (2015), the author highlights this important point 
stating,“While Obergefell’s most immediate effect was to legalize same-sex marriage across the 
land, its long-term impact could extend far beyond this context. To see this point, consider how 
much more narrowly the opinion could [emphasis added] have been written. It could have 
invoked the equal protection and due process guarantees without specifying a formal level of 
review, and then observed that none of the state justifications survived even a deferential form of 
scrutiny. The Court had adopted this strategy in prior gay rights cases.”  In A new Birth of 
Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, at 159. 
 Obergefell similar to Andersen, Kerrigen, and In re Marriage undertook an equal 
protection and due process analysis in ruling on same-sex marriage. Unlike the state courts, the 
U.S Supreme Court, was not bogged down by the semantics of determining the level of scrutiny 
or if sexual orientation was a suspect classification. Instead, unlike the other courts, they 
immediately found a fundamental right involved. The Court concluded that marriage is so 
integral to our society that same-sex couples — whose love and relationships are equal to that of 
heterosexual couples — cannot be withheld.  
History of Same-Sex Marriage Court Rulings  
 Thirty-seven states legalized same-sex marriage before the decision in Obergefell. Below 
is a brief review of each ruling.  
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Alaska 
 A federal district court in Alaska held on October 12, 2014, in the case Hamby v. Parnell, 
56 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (D. Alaska. 2014) that Alaska's statutory and constitutional bans on same-
sex marriage violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States 
Constitution. 
 Arizona 
 On January 6, 2014, in Connolly v. Jeanes, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (D. Ariz. 2014) four 
same-sex couples filed a class-action lawsuit in federal district court seeking to have Arizona's 
definition of marriage ruled unconstitutional. On March 13, 2014, in Majors v. Horne, 14 F. 
Supp. 3d 1313 (D. Ariz. 2014), a U.S. District Judge ordered that the state record a death 
certificate for plaintiff George Martinez as the husband of Fred McQuire. On October 17, 2014, a 
U.S. District judge ruling in both cases, declared Arizona's ban on same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional and enjoined the state from enforcing its ban, effective immediately. Arizona 
Attorney General Tom Horn said the state would not appeal the ruling and instructed county 
clerks to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 
 
Colorado 
 On June 25, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the case of Kitchen 
v. Herbert, 961 F. 3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013), ruled that Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage violated 
the U.S. Constitution. The ruling in Kitchen is binding on courts in every state within the Circuit, 
including Colorado. Since the Court of Appeals stayed implementation of this ruling pending 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court, courts in Colorado have had to follow the precedent that 
Kitchen sets and stay subsequent rulings pending the expiration of that stay. 
 XI 
Florida 
 Same-sex marriage has been legally recognized in the U.S. state of Florida since January 
6, 2015, as a result of Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Fla. 2014). In this case, a 
federal district court ruled the state's same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional on August 21, 
2014. 
Idaho 
 In May of 2014, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho in the case of 
Latta v. Otter, 771 F .3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014),  found Idaho's statutory and state constitutional 
bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, but enforcement of that ruling was stayed pending 
appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling on October 7, 2014, though the 
U.S Supreme Court issued a stay of the ruling, which was not lifted until October 15, 2014. 
Indiana 
 Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F. 3d 648 (7th. Cir 2014), was filed in the Southern District of 
Indiana on March 14, 2014, by Lambda Legal on behalf of two same-sex couples, all women. A 
federal district court found in favor of the plaintiff-couples, granted them summary judgment and 
striking down Indiana's ban on same-sex marriage. On September 4, 2014, the Seventh Circuit, 
in a unanimous opinion, upheld the district court's decision. 
Iowa 
 A unanimous Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a lower state court’s ruling in Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (2009). Using intermediate scrutiny to evaluate Iowa's justifications for 
denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the court determined that denying a marriage 
licenses on the basis of sexual orientation violated the equal protection clause of the Iowa 
Constitution. Please note that the intermediate level of scrutiny employed was virtually identical 
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to the same level of scrutiny applied by the Vermont Supreme Court’s 1999 hallmark decision in 
Baker v. Vermont.  
Kansas 
 In Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175 (D. Kan. 2014),  a U.S. District Judge issued a 
preliminary injunction barring the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment, Douglas County, and Sedwick County from enforcing Kansas's same-sex marriage 
ban on November 4, 2014. 
 Montana 
  In Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Mont. 2014) a U.S. District Court Judge 
ruled for the plaintiffs on November 19, 2014, and his injunction against the state's enforcement 
of its ban on same-sex marriage took effect immediately. Montana Attorney General Fox 
announced plans to appeal the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. At the request of 
all parties, the Ninth Circuit suspended proceedings involving the state's appeal on February 9, 
2015, pending action by the Supreme Court in Obergefell. 
Nevada 
 In Sevcik v. Sandoval 911 F. 2d 996 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit on October 7, 
reversed the lower federal district court's ruling in Sevcik, remanding the case back to district 
court with direction to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. This effectively legalized same-
sex marriage in Nevada. 
New Jersey 
 The New Jersey State Supreme Court reasoned in Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A. 
3d 336 (2013), because same-sex couples in New Jersey were limited to civil unions, which are 
not recognized as marriages under federal law, the state must permit civil marriage for same-sex 
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couples. This ruling, in turn, relied on the 2006 decision of the  New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415; 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) holding that the state was 
constitutionally required to afford the rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples under 
New Jersey’s Equal Protection clause. 
New Mexico 
 In Griego v. Oliver, 316 P. 3d 865 (10th Cir. 2013), a District Court Judge ruled for the 
plaintiffs, finding that state marriage statutes that prohibit the issuance of marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples "are unconstitutional and unenforceable under Article II, Section 18, New 
Mexico Constitution." On December 19, 2013, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the 
State Constitution required the extension of marriage rights to same-sex couples. Its decision said 
that the Equal Protection Clause under Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution 
required that "All rights, protections, and responsibilities that result from the marital relationship 
shall apply equally to both same-gender and opposite-gender married couples." 
North Carolina 
 Same sex marriage has been legally recognized in the state since October 10, 2014, when 
a U.S. District Court judge ruled in General Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Cooper, 317 
A. 3d 415 (4th Cir. 2014), that the state's denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples was 
unconstitutional. The ruling in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision not to hear an appeal in that case established the unconstitutionality of North Carolina's 
ban on same-sex marriage. 
Oklahoma 
 In Bishop v. United States, 760 F. 3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), On January 14, 2014, a 
federal district court Judge ruled Part A of the Oklahoma constitutional amendment banning 
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same-sex marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. The Court applied rational basis review and found the state's justifications 
inadequate, including encouraging responsible procreation, optimal child-rearing, and the impact 
on the institution of marriage 
Oregon 
 Same sex marriage has been legally recognized in Oregon since May 19, 2014, when a 
federal district court judge ruled in Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. OR. 2014), 
that Oregon's 2004 state constitutional amendment banning such marriages discriminated on the 
basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal 
Constitution.  
Pennsylvania  
 In Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 410 (D. MD. 2014), on May 20, 2014, a Federal 
District Court Judge ruled in that Pennsylvania's same-sex marriage ban is unconstitutional. The 
Governor announced afterward that he would not appeal the Court’s decision, effectively making 
Pennsylvania the 19th state to recognize same-sex marriage. 
South Carolina 
 Before the ruling in the 2014 of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bostic v. 
Schaefer, 760 F. 3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), which found Virginia's ban on same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional, Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 514 (S.C. 2014), challenged the state statute 
and constitutional amendment that deny legal recognition to same-sex marriages established in 
other jurisdictions in the U.S District of South Carolina. Bostic was resolved quickly thereafter in 
favor of same-sex marriage on October 6, 2014, with the decision by the Supreme Court of the 
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United States not to hear an appeal, thus leaving Bostic as binding precedent in federal courts in 
South Carolina.  
Utah 
 A federal district court for Utah ruled in the case of Kitchen, which found that barring 
same-sex couples from marriage violated the U.S Constitution. The issuance of those licenses 
was halted during the period of January 6, 2014 until October 6, 2014, following the resolution 
of a lawsuit challenging the state's ban on same-sex marriage. On that day, following the U.S 
Supreme Court’s refusal to hear an appeal in a case that found Utah's ban on same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the state to recognize same-sex 
marriage. 
 
 
Virginia 
 On February 13, 2014, in Bostic, a federal district court judge ruled that Virginia's 
statutory and constitutional ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals struck down Virginia's ban on same-sex marriage. The U.S. Supreme Court 
stayed of enforcement of the ruling.  
 
 
West Virginia 
 On February 13, 2014, in Bostic, a federal district court ruled that Virginia's statutory and 
constitutional ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled in favor of striking down Virginia's ban on same-sex marriage. The U.S. Supreme Court 
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stayed of enforcement of the ruling. This ruling is binding on all states in the Fourth Circuit, 
including West Virginia. 
Wisconsin 
 A U.S. District Court, in Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Wis. 2014), ruled on 
June 6, 2014, that the state's constitutional and legislative restrictions on same sex marriage 
interfere with the fundamental right to marry, violating the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution and discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, violating the Equal Protection 
Clause. The state appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which combined 
the case for briefing and oral argument with the similar Indiana case Baskin unanimous upheld 
the district court decisions.  
 
 
Wyoming 
 On October 7, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court declined an appeal from Guzzo v. Mead, 
386 F. 3d 674 (10th Cir. 2014), from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that invalidated state 
bans on same-sex marriage in Wyoming and states under the aegis of the Tenth Circuit. 
Methodology  
 During my broad-sweeping examination of the caselaw history of same-sex marriage in 
the United States, using Westlaw (a proprietary legal database that is this nation’s most 
comprehensive), I found a collection of fifty cases in different jurisdictions and courts. From 
these fifty cases, it was critical to reconnoiter all relevant precedential cases, which invalidated 
bans on same-sex marriage, thus yielding thirty-seven states. Of these, the vast majority of cases 
involved both the federal district and federal appellate courts. These federal cases all follow a 
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distinct, nearly identical formula of equal protection and due process analysis yielding little 
variation. Thus, at the begin of this project the state level was more interesting and varied, in 
terms of constitutional provisions available to challenge these same-sex marriage proscriptions.  
 Approximately fifty same-sex marriage cases were surveyed in relation to this project, 
that began one year ago. Of those fifty, thirty-seven of the cases invalidated bans of same-sex 
marriage before Obergefell was rendered in 2015. Of those thirty-seven, only eight cases 
legalized same sex marriage via their state supreme courts. 
 Ultimately, the motivating factor in picking Vermont, California, and Connecticut and 
Washington was each of these states had a challenge to a state constitutional provision. With 
these states came an additional point A clear variation of judicial review and in-turn, different 
levels of scrutiny. California demonstrates a clear example of strict scrutiny, while Connecticut 
illustrates intermediate scrutiny. Washington used a rational basis test. While the Vermont 
Supreme Court holding in Baker was a novel case with similarities to the federal government and 
the standard of review used by the federal judiciary, implementing its own intermediate scrutiny. 
This provides the reader with a sensibility of how a state appellate court can reach a conclusion 
without employing conventional federal standards.  
 In total, over 120 legal decisions were critically scrutinized and ultimately included in 
this paper, although more than 250 appellate decisions were considered. 
 
 
